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New Republic

STATE OF THE UNION



THE ISSUES IN 1951

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What do you mean— LIBERAL?

JOHN HENRY SMITH is a thorough-going liberal. Politically, no one tells him how to vote. He makes it his business to know something of the men who are running for office and where they stand on important issues. He talks, thinks, decides, then votes. On social issues no one hoodwinks him into backing "any old cause." Just once he was "used." Burnt his fingers a bit, but it didn't make him fire-shy. Now, after supporting an issue, he checks the facts: Who will benefit and how? Is it worth it? Who's for it and why; who's not? (A man can waste a lot of time fighting windmills.)

SOME say Smith is not a liberal economically. He earns a decent income—spends most of it. But he doesn't hold with the idea of "communal wealth." Instead, he works sincerely for equal education and equal employment opportunities for all, believing that a child's future should not be handicapped by its parents' limitations.

Religion? Smith doesn't have any—at least he doesn't go to church. After a great deal of thought, he decided that there are three things in the world that keep people apart: differing cultures, differing languages and religion. Creeds, he decided, are divisive; why not a church without a creed? He became interested in reading Jefferson—marked certain passages he especially liked: "I am for freedom in religion, and against all maneuvers to bring about a legal ascendancy of one sect over another. . . . Reason and free inquiry are the only effectual agents against error. Give a loose to them, they will support true religion by bringing every false one to their tribunal, to the test of their investigation."

Creed and dogma, Smith concluded, are in opposition to reason and free inquiry. So he doesn't go to church. Yes, John Henry Smith is a thorough-going liberal.

But John Smith is mistaken.

There is a liberal religion, an organized faith without a creed. For four centuries it has steadfastly adhered to these three principles: (1) individual freedom of belief, (2) the use of reason in religion, (3) a generous tolerance for differing religious points of view. This religion is commonly known as Unitarianism.

An Associated Press dispatch recently states of Unitarians: "There is little looking backward in the Unitarian Church. . . . Although not trading on its past, the history of Unitarianism is impressive. . . . It has exerted an influence out of all proportion to its size." Although comparatively small (80,000 members), the denomination has attracted thousands of members in the last few years. Whether one checks the HALL OF FAME records or WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA, he will find the names of Unitarians far out-ranking all others in proportion to members. This is due to the fact that, whereas other denominations stress dogma and creed, Unitarians attempt to translate religion into living, human terms. The deed, not the creed, is important. Consequently, it has attracted leaders in every major community.

Religion has been defined as "man's devotion to his highest ideals as exemplified by his conduct." If this be accepted, then religion must be the motivating force through which all improvements in human relations can be accomplished.

For further information concerning this dynamic religion, order one of the three explanatory booklets: "Introducing Unitarianism" by John Nicholls Booth (10¢), "Unitarianism, Some Past History and Present Meanings" by Harry B. Scholefield (25¢), or "A Unitarian States His Case" by Robert W. Sonen (cloth-bound book; list price $2; special to New Republic readers, $1). Stamps, money orders or checks may be forwarded. For your convenience, use the coupon below.

Munroe Husbands, Clerk
Unitarian Church of the Larger Fellowship
25 Beacon Street, Boston 8, Mass.

I am interested in the liberal Unitarian religion. Please send the pamphlet(s) indicated below, for which I enclose payment of $.

( ) "Introducing Unitarianism" (10¢)
( ) "Unitarianism. Past History and Present Meanings" (25¢)
( ) "A Unitarian States His Case" ($1)

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

YEARS FROM NOW we shall remember last week in the contrasting personalities of two men, General Eisenhower and Senator Taft. We watched each man do his stuff—Ike starting off to Europe to raise morale, Taft on the Senate floor tearing it down. It spoiled our sleep for a couple of nights afterwards, thinking about it.

Ike looked pretty good to us back in uniform again, we have to admit. This was particularly true after he started talking. He is a simple, direct, unpretentious speaker with none of the spur-jangling rhetoric of MacArthur, thank heaven. There is a fervor about him, too. There he was, with his grin and his pink, bald dome covered with just about as much brown fuzz as it wore back in London in the black war days. In London he was the rallying point of quiet strength. And quite consciously he was going back to Europe now in a new and possibly more difficult kind of crisis, trying to lift hearts, unify spirits and breathe life into a paper army. He talked at the Pentagon; it was a sudden spring-like day and through the window there were fleecy clouds in a blue sky, the placid Potomac, and beyond it the distant white Capitol. The chests of Ike's two assistant generals were hardly big enough to hold all their service ribbons, but Ike's simple five-star uniform carried only a line of three. He struck us as one of the country's precious national assets, standing solidly there and radiating quiet confidence. Hard-boiled reporters seemed to have the same feeling as we came away. We all felt more cheerful and encouraged. He was above politics and malice, and he expressed basic faith in America. It took courage for Ike to throw his reputation into a risky venture like this, and he did it unhesitantly.

It took some courage, maybe, for a politician like Harry Truman to send a potential rival on a great throw of the dice like this from which Ike might some day reach the Presidency. If we know our little man in the White House, he didn't hesitate either.

So now we come to Taft on the Senate floor the next day declaring that, "We had better commit no American troops to the European Continent at this time." Taft spoke earnestly and sincerely. He read his 10,000-word speech and read it fast. Sometimes he grew so intent he got ahead of himself and had to repeat. He swayed rhythmically holding the pages in his left hand. The speech ranged all over the foreign-policy lot and was partly self-justification and legalistic criticism of the Administration and partly reiteration of the theories that made Taft and a handful of others vote originally against the Atlantic Pact. Our spirits fell lower and lower as we looked down, fascinated.

This was not isolationism like Hoover's; it was defeatism. Taft was telling the young men and the taxpayers and the mothers that it wasn't worthwhile, really, to employ big US armies: (a) we couldn't afford it, (b) we could do everything cheaper and easier with air and sea power, (c) Russia probably wasn't going to attack anyway, and (d) if it did, we could do little to stop them in Europe. "But isn't this defeatism?" demanded Sen. Paul Douglas (D, Ill.). Taft didn't deny it, just repeated that Russia could move in any time and that trying to create a big army would probably provoke Moscow to strike. When Senator Fulbright (D, Ark.) used the word "shocking" in describing this thesis, Taft heatedly replied that the destruction of Europe's industrial potential wouldn't come from advancing Russians: it would be destroyed, he observed cheerfully, from the atom bombs of retreating Americans dropped to render the plants useless. What a billet-doux to send along with Eisenhower to Europe! We can imagine nothing so calcu-

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lated to curdle the blood of the nerve-torn people Ike is trying to unite with us.

There was an undercurrent of partisan bitterness in what Taft said, but of his sincerity and earnestness there could be no doubt. Well, the big debate has started in Congress. Taft was notably more extreme in his answers to floor questions than in his prepared comments; he was back on the cautious side again in his "Meet the Press" radio interview next day.

Truman partly answered Taft in his State of the Union address Monday; Taft came on again in his National Press Club speech Tuesday. Truman was back again in his economic report to Congress scheduled for mid-week.

Congress met in re-furbished chambers as sprig and fresh as new Easter hats. The Senate Democrats picked, as majority leader, genial, dogged, beefy McFarland of Arizona.

While we think of it we should note the absence of practically all national columnists and Washington newspaper bureau chiefs while Taft was speaking. There is a tendency among the Washington "Deep Thinkers" in the press corps to ignore the difficult job of covering Congress. Some of them regard Congress as rather nasty anyway. We hold no brief for Congress, God knows, but the columnists idea that Messrs. Dewey and Dulles are formulating foreign policy, and not Congress, is carrying things to extremes.

A curious little instance of press irresponsibility occurred last week. No doubt hoping to provoke a gusty retort from Truman, a reporter at his press conference suddenly told the President that Taft had suggested that he [Truman] ought to be kicked; what did Truman think should be done in turn to Taft? Truman for a wonder declined to comment. Later information showed Taft had never made any such remark. We record the incident simply to show the absence of any feeling of national anxiety among many people: an anxiety which if it existed might create an uncomfortable corresponding feeling of responsibility.

Washington T. R. B.

CORRESPONDENCE

Library Censorship

SIR: Early this autumn the ukase of the County Counsel ruled the *Christian Science Monitor* off the shelves of public schools and of city colleges within Los Angeles County. This week we are notified that the ban has been extended to include the *Christian Century.*

Both teachers and citizens who wish to enjoy and to communicate an attitude of balanced judgment are aghast. One begins to wonder not whether but just when an official banning of magazines will be followed by the official burning of books. . . .

Los Angeles, Calif. C. W.

World Federation

SIR: I noted your news item last week on World Federation and the DAR-VFW opposition, and thought you would be interested in a letter Clay Nixon, past commander of the Marine Corps League, recently sent to the heads of all the veterans' organizations.

The Nixon letter says: "Each of your organizations should take affirmative steps to see that state legislatures convening this year actively remove these (world federation) resolutions, thus causing a strengthening of the moral fiber and morale of our people to aggressively combat everything which may act as 'morphine' to the pain of war. This rosy dream of world peace will destroy the realism of the need of every man, woman and child, and the industry of America to prepare for a fighting, shooting war of world magnitude."

Happy thought, isn't it?

Washington, D. C. PEGGY DUDLEY

Reprints on Davies

SIR: The request of James E. Phillips that you make available the article "Did Hitler Win?" by the Reverend A. Powell Davies in a form to be purchased, just beats me to the draw.

I have been intending to suggest that ever since reading the article. I know of nothing which compares with it or is more greatly needed at the present time.

I really think that reprinting it is an obligation you assumed when you published it. Put me down for the second hundred. Mr. Phillips is ahead of me for the first.

Kansas City, Mo. GEORGE H. FORSEE

Ickes and MacArthur

SIR: I cannot agree with Mr. Ickes in his articles on General MacArthur. MacArthur has rendered such a distinguished service both as a general and as an administrator in Japan as to put him a little above the personal attacks that Mr. Ickes continues to shower on him.

Please let me say at once that I read Mr. Ickes' column with a great deal of interest and satisfaction. For the most part he fights the men and the issues in our national life which I think ought to be fought. It is an added satisfaction to me that he does it in language which cannot be misinterpreted. His is one of the fighting voices of liberalism in this country. Long may it speak.

But I do not agree with him on the "defeats" of MacArthur, either as to fact or conclusion. His present demand that MacArthur be brought home savors too much of the disunity which is in the demand for the resignation of Acheson. It will do no good and it adds to the difficulties of the President.

Anyway, now that we know about all that Mr. Ickes thinks about MacArthur and his record anything more would be a little too much.

Kansas City, Mo. GEORGE H. FORSEE

The Future of the Class Struggle

SIR: There are some people who think that with the disappearance of the Communists and of the Communist Party from the domestic scene and from the world scene the idea of the class struggle will also vanish. Imagine a time after World War III, and the Soviet Union and its satellites and its parties are no more. Imagine a world where capitalist democracy prevails everywhere. Imagine a world where our constitutional liberties are enjoyed everywhere. Imagine a world where the people look upon the Communists of the past as creatures of a dark and debased period of the twentieth century. Will such a world be free of the class struggle. Of course not.

In a democracy such as Americans envisage we need the class struggle if we are to have that kind of conflict and dispute and contention which leads to the corrosion of complacency and the mitigation of the rigidity that comes with an unquestioned status quo. Even if we should develop a society where economic prosperity is the absolute rule and the things of life are in abundance we will have to create the "class struggle" in order that the human race does not die from the inanition that comes with the absence of anger and wrath and jealousy and moral indignation.

New York City MARTIN WOLFSON

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VOLUME 124, NUMBER 3, ISSUE 1885, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1951 **New Republic**

THE LESSON OF ATHENS

GENERAL MARSHALL, the wisest of our leaders, remarked recently: "I doubt whether a man can think with full wisdom and deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens."

Accordingly *Life* magazine reviewed the war. We recommend its article as must reading—for the editors of *Life* and all other partisans of unlimited war.

Athens was the pinnacle of Greek civilization; its achievements imperishable; its laws democratic; its tradition heroic; its people bold and proud. "We are the school of Hellas," cried Pericles. "We throw open our city to the world!"

Sparta in contrast was a police state, ruled by austere militarists; peopled by slaves, ingrown and fearful of the attractive force of freedom; united to Athens by a common enemy and divided by rivalry after victory. When fighting began between the satellite nations of both sides, it could not be contained because, as *Life* notes, "People had increasingly come to be paralyzed by their own acceptance of the inevitability of war."

Sparta was dominant on land. Yet at first every force favored Athens. Her downfall was a tragedy of self-destruction.

Athens and her democratic allies were joined in the Delian League. But fear and arrogance led Athens to turn the League into an empire. So it drove its allies to revolt and enabled Sparta to pose as the Liberator of Hellas.

"Athens," as *Life* suggests, "failed to grasp the most elemental principles about the free association of nations. For the bond of principle it substituted the bond of power. Fear and exigency led it into the illusion that allies which had been won by coercion would have the stamina of allies won by conviction. In its own fear it failed to appreciate the deep instinctive fear of lesser states of being exploited by their grander ally."

In war, Pericles counselled patience knowing that Athens could win by perseverance and would lose if she squandered her forces in indecisive battles. He told his people, "To wait quietly, to attempt no new conquests, to expose the city to no new hazards." Thucydides notes that, "What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies."

Suffering setbacks, Athens lost its sense of values. "Reckless audacity came to be considered courage," Thucydides wrote, "prudent hesitation specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness; ability to see all sides of a question inability to act on any; . . . the advocate of extreme measures was always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected."

Finally, facing defeat, the Athenians, as *Life* adds, "broke the reins of reason and lusted for grandiose action. Their leaders winced and took action affecting the fate of the world under the heedless lash of frenzied opinion screaming for the gaudiest gesture and the cheapest victory."

For Athens, this inner collapse of the spirit led first to isolation, then to blockade, finally to occupation and the ruin of Greek civilization.

Are we traveling the road of Athens? The parallels of strength and those of weakness are plain.

One parallel is spiritual retreat. Already "reckless audacity" is considered courage, and moderation, "a cloak for unmanliness."

The second parallel is inconstancy. We also permit vital decisions to be dictated by emotion—shrinking from defense in Europe, plunging toward war in Asia; our citizens "allowing private ambitions to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies."

The third parallel is irresponsibility. Athens became unreliable. Today we pledge ourselves to Europe's defense. On the strength of our pledge our allies risk rearmament. Our opposition leader then disowns our signature. "The breach of a treaty," the Corinthians declared, "cannot be laid to the people whom desertion compels to seek new relations but to the power that fails to assist its confederates."

The fourth parallel is arrogance. Life, noting with pleasure that Athens was imperialistic, called three years ago for an "American Empire" to include all nations not controlled by Russia. We bow to that fatal premise and follow Athens when today we commit our allies

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by unilateral decisions in Asia to policies they oppose.

The fifth parallel is recklessness, urged on us by those who demand unlimited war, without allies and without the prospect of victory, against a secondary enemy. Taft declares: "It is ridiculous to talk about avoiding war with Communist China." *Life*, which is neither dishonest nor oblique, states simply:

> *Life* sees no choice but to acknowledge the existence of war with Red China and to set about its defeat in full assurance that this course will probably involve war with the Soviet Union as well.

". . . The advocates of extreme measure were always trustworthy; his opponent a man to be suspected. . . ." Should the extremists win, a new Thucydides might well pick up his pen, choosing for text the prophetic foreboding of Pericles: "I fear more our own blunders than the devices of the enemy."

THE WEEK

BEGIN ALL OVER

UN HEADQUARTERS (NR correspondent)

Last week the three-man cease-fire committee of the United Nations officially admitted what had been evident to everyone: that its efforts to call a truce in Korea had failed. The Asian-Arab bloc of 12 countries (reduced from 13 by the omission of the Philippines) went on holding secret meetings, trying to find some new formula that might have a chance of success; but no one is optimistic about the prospect. As the days go by it seems more and more probable that the Chinese Communists mean exactly what they say: they will do their utmost to drive the UN forces out of Korea; they will not negotiate on any other basis than admission to the UN and a deal of some sort in regard to Formosa. The US-UN forces can certainly continue to hold some sort of beachhead in Korea for a substantial length of time; but it is problematical whether this will really improve our bargaining power vis-a-vis the Communists.

If the efforts to end the fighting should fail, the UN will turn to discussion of formally stigmatizing the Peking Government as an aggressor, and to a possible general application of economic sanctions such as the United States has already applied unilaterally. Here we have another illustration of the now familiar fact that the United States is far more belligerent and unyielding than a majority of the members of the UN, even though both sides are doing their utmost to prevent this difference from becoming too apparent. Beyond the moral issue involved, diplomats at the UN question whether economic sanctions applied to China would have any real effect. The Chinese Communists, they point out, seem to have plenty of arms, largely of American manufacture, bought or seized from Chiang Kai-shek's troops during the recent civil war. Russia would certainly supply whatever they lack; and an effort to extend general sanctions to the entire Eurasian Communist area would be ineffective in a military sense and highly dangerous in that it might help to bring on the World War we are seeking to avoid. These are some of the considerations which cause many members of the UN to feel that the Americans are today refusing to face the facts of the situation.

MEETING OF THE BIG FOUR?

The ponderous wheels of diplomacy inched forward last week in regard to a possible meeting of the foreign ministers of the Big Four—the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia. For several months, the Russians have been arguing in favor of an international conference to deal with German questions. The Western powers have insisted on the contrary that any future international conference must deal with all the questions at issue between East and West, including the problems of the Orient. The specific proposal is for a conference of deputies to the foreign ministers for the purpose of seeing whether an agenda for a conference could be drawn up that is acceptable to all four powers. Russia's reply last week to our latest note did not slam the door; it merely repeated conditions which the Western powers have already pronounced unacceptable.

The chief factors in the situation are these:

Russia is believed to be ready to offer disarmament of Eastern Germany in exchange for abandonment of plans to rearm Western Germany. This plan at least is very much to Russia's advantage. There are 17 million Eastern Germans and 47 million Western Germans. The 80 Soviet Divisions that wait inside Russia, together with the large Polish Army now being organized, can easily overrun Europe if Germany is undefended. The allies cannot hold Germany or Europe without German troops. For this reason a limited agreement on Germany would serve simply to freeze the status quo of an undefended Europe, open to Soviet attack. The essence of the situation is that we have retreated in Europe until our back is against the wall. We cannot afford further retreats.

Nevertheless, the threat of a rearmed Germany is obvious and may lead the French to press negotiations.

Russia may try to sweeten her offer by agreeing to an Austrian treaty. The West has long desired this treaty. Now under changed conditions our leaders are no longer sure that a treaty, leading to evacuation of allied troops from the area while satellite troops surround Austria, would not heighten the danger of war.

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Russia's reluctance to discuss the Far East with us is partly due to the same problem which has arisen in the UN: we refuse to include the Chinese Communists in such discussions as long as they continue their present aggression in Korea. The Russians on the contrary won't discuss the Far East at all unless the Peking Government participates.

On the last point the United States stands alone in the Big Three, just as she is almost alone in the UN. Both France and Britain, if they could act as free agents, would include the Chinese Communists in big-power discussions of the Far East, just as they would also admit the Peking Government to the UN.

THE HOOVER LINE GROWS

Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of the Allied Forces in Europe, has left Washington to consult with leaders in the capitals of the 12 countries which constitute the Atlantic alliance. His main purpose is personally to investigate the strength of the European determination to shoulder their part of the burden of a "defensive movement for the preservation of peace." Before leaving, he stressed that sacrifices by the US are a vital necessity if our leadership of Western defense is to be successful. "There is no system of treaties, words or terminologies that alone can make the Allied Forces a success."

In Congress, meanwhile, Republican isolationists were getting ready to shape the Hoover doctrine into an instrument of sabotage against the Atlantic alliance. The first to attack was Rep. Frederic Coudert Jr. (R, N. Y.) who wanted the Congress to forbid the President to send any more troops overseas "without the prior authorization of Congress in each instance." His resolution condemned US participation in Korea as unconstitutional and provided that the only funds available for overseas troops shipment should be funds "necessary to facilitate the extrication of US forces now in Korea."

Coudert, whose law firm represented Vichy France in its suits against the US during the last war, attacked the basis of North Atlantic defense on a narrow and often-repudiated legalistic point. Presidential power to send the armed forces overseas has been solidly established by history. As Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R, Mich.) pointed out in 1948: "There is a general constitutional power resident in the President of the United States as Commander in Chief, which has been exercised 100 or 125 times in the last 150 years, to use the armed forces of the United States externally for the protection . . . of American interests without the direct license of the Congress. . . ."

There has historically been a working affinity between the isolationists and the legalists—the former attacked Roosevelt's 1941 destroyer deal as warmongering, the latter as dictatorship. There are signs that this coalition is again tightening. Coudert said that he had intended to offer the same resolution last year but had been warned by the GOP leadership that the time was "not yet ripe." Now, he said, "the many events since" have changed that position. From Coudert's brief, Sen. Robert Taft (R, Ohio) then presented the full GOP case —based on Hoover, the value of the dollar and a benign image of the politburo.

THE COALITION REIGNS

On the first day of the 82nd Congress, Republicans and Southern Democrats exhibited the strength of their combined forces. Defeat of the highly desirable 21-day rule, which for two years has blocked Rules Committee power to pigeonhole legislation, was a portent of what will probably happen to Administration measures this session. The Rules reform of two years ago gave each committee chairman the right to bring a bill to the floor if the Rules Committee, after 21 days, had refused to report it out. For years, the 12-member Rules Committee has been dominated by four Republicans and four Southern Democrats, a majority which before it was stripped of its powers kept many a Fair Deal measure from reaching the floor. Rep. Adolph Sabath (D, Ill.), Chairman of the Rules Committee for 12 years, fought vigorously for the 21-day rule because, he said, the Democratic majority is only a "paper majority" and the "coalition uses its power to defeat liberal and progressive legislation. . . ." As a result of the 21-day rule, Sabath said, eight bills, including the anti-poll-tax bill, statehood measures for Hawaii and Alaska and the National Science Foundation bill, by-passed Rules Committee bottlenecks and were given favorable consideration by the House.

The fight for restoration of the "gag" rule was led by Rep. Eugene Cox (D, Ga.), ranking Dixiecrat on the Rules Committee, who offered a substitute set of rules returning to the Committee its life and death power over bills. He was aided by Republican Committeeman Charles A. Halleck (Ind.) who admitted it was the coalition's intention to block "socialized medicine, the socialistic Brannan farm program, and all of the other things on the President's program" as the measures came up for consideration in the Rules Committee. The House voted 244-179 to rescind the 21-day rule. The coalition mustered 92 Democrats, mostly Southerners, and 152 Republicans. Only 42 Republicans and 136 Democrats voted with Sabath. There is no doubt now that the Democratic majority in the House, just as it is in the Rules Committee, is a "paper majority" and domestic welfare measures will suffer accordingly. Rep. John McCormack (D, Mass.) observed that Republican members seem willing to ride "the tail of the Dixiecrat kite."

JUSTICE AND EDUCATION

The United States Supreme Court last week affirmed a lower court decision ordering the admission of a Negro student to the law school of Louisiana State University. It was the twenty-eighth Supreme Court victory of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which has waged the successful legal fight against segregation on the graduate and professional level.

The high court unanimously upheld the decision of a special three-judge federal court in New Orleans, which had cited the Supreme Court rulings affecting the Universities of Texas and Oklahoma, and ordered LSU to admit Roy S. Wilson to its law school.

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OUTSIDE AMERICA

When Julius Caesar visited the town of Lutetia Parisiorum—now the city of Paris—the place was already a well-established Gaulish capital. The visit is mentioned in Section Four, Chapter Three, Book VI of the old Roman conqueror's book on the *Gallic Wars*. The date was 53 B.C.

Nevertheless, the French Government has officially decided that in 1951 Paris is exactly, and only, 2,000 years old and has arranged for the anniversary to be celebrated from April to December. "Perhaps," the Manchester *Guardian* comments, "the French, noblest inheritors of the classical spirit, have forgotten their history. For all their clarity and precision, they have made a bloomer. Or are they rewriting their history in the modern manner?"

There is another possible explanation. The French are so worried about a visit to Paris of still another foreign conqueror in the Caesarian tradition— this time Josef Stalin—that they would like to forget all about the visit of the first of the long series. They see so clearly and precisely the dangers that hang over Paris in 1951 that they are trying to write in advance a pleasanter, modern history for the city than they expect.

"For nine months," the official note about the celebration says, "Paris is going to be the brightest and most cheerful capital in the world."

For the French, who are not usually given to the superlatives of American advertising—even in the cajolement of tourists—the language is a trifle extreme. On the fact of it, such a gaudy boast seems as much an ersatz as the historical anniversary, little more than a distorted reflection of a yearning for *some* brightness and cheer.

Yet, here too, there is another explanation. A certain number of Frenchmen, especially those close to Foreign Minister Schuman, believe there is really a chance—possibly the last—to avoid the onrushing war, and in the common French view that also means to avoid the conquest and occupation of France that must almost inevitably follow. The chance is that Secretary Acheson, instead of taking more risks quickly, instead of acting boldly in his statement after the Brussels conference that "what we have done has been too short and too slow," will agree with Schuman that the moment calls not only for action but for diplomacy and for a diplomacy both of frankness and prudence. The chance is also and above all that the Americans will not dismiss the Four-Power conference as merely a Soviet trap, a propaganda trick, or even a weapon of veiled aggression; but will instead accept it as the last opportunity to establish a modus vivendi in Europe.

The French feel that their only remaining national weapon is diplomacy. They know that, behind the scenes, outside their power to exert any influence, it has gone into battle to prevent the defeatist faction among the Americans —those who believe that all diplomacy is now useless and dangerous—from wrecking the Four-Power conference before it gets started. Between the two—the before and the after—lies the last chance.

If the chance fails, the French expect the Soviets to strike their first military blow in Europe as they did in Asia—through the satellites. The East Germans will "repel aggression" from the West Germans, and with the East Germans will march the Polish and Czech armies, commanded by men like Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky. But if the chance succeeds, Paris will be "the brightest and most cheerful capital in the world."

Naturally, in neither case will Washington be particularly gay, nor will London—despite the Festival of Britain —since both the Americans and the British realize that a modus vivendi is not a peace, and both peoples will expect some degree of self-sacrifice and austerity. The recent development that has made the French recognize that they too may have to accept a degree of austerity, even the terrible extreme of some sacrifices on the table, has been the news of strengthening of isolationist currents in the United States. The stories, widely published in France, that America might shift its strategy to a "peripheral defense" of Europe—of England, Spain and North Africa—had the effect of shock treatment on the French state of mind. They had more effect in counteracting the general defeatist inertia than had the Brussels communiqués or Eisenhower's appointment.

In so far as American policy takes more and bolder risks—as in General MacArthur's conduct of the latter phases of the advance into North Korea, as in the high-speed methods of West German rearmament, or as in talk of wrecking in advance the Four-Power conference—the effect in France is to stimulate passive, hopeless neutralist defeatism. In so far as American policy takes greater but careful risks—as in going ahead with Atlantic rearmament without assuring in advance full and proportionally equal participation and sacrifice by the French and other European peoples —the effect in France is to stimulate hopefulness but no impulse to action. In so far as American policy threatens to be pulled away from the defense of Europe by reinforced isolationism and defeatism in American public opinion, the effect in France is to transform passive anxiety into active dread—and the possibility of real action.

The shock treatment of a threat to abandon continental Europe has, however, the dangers of all shock treatment —it may cripple permanently instead of curing, and in this case the patient is the already terribly ailing continental European, especially French, morale. Eisenhower's biggest and first task as commander in Europe is to make the shock treatment work—to remind Europeans of the real facts of their history in 1951, and to drive home to them bluntly the primary fact that he and the rest of the Americans will be in Europe to help the Europeans only if they recognize that they can afford the luxury neither of gloomy, passive, inert defeatism nor of brightness and cheer based upon the sacrifice of Americans *for* them and not *with* them. PERCY WINNER

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New Republic Special Supplement

STATE OF THE UNION

THE ISSUES IN 1951

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I. STRENGTH IN UNITY

THE STATE OF THE UNION in 1951 means the state of all free peoples. They share a common faith in human rights. They hold a common trust in the UN. They fight on a common front in Korea. They face a common peril in Soviet imperialism. They cannot withstand it alone.

Without the support of the United States the Soviet empire will spread across Asia and Western Europe. If those continents are lost, the United States will be forced ultimately to concede the victory of Communist aggression. But when the free nations stand together aggression cannot win. Together they comprise two-thirds of the world's peoples. They turn out four-fifths of the world's production. They control three-quarters of the resources needed for war. As long as the free nations are united, no aggressor is likely to risk war. Unity is our rock of salvation on which we can build world peace.

The unity of the free nations is not yet firmly established. We have turned at last to face the costs of survival. But our survival is not yet ensured. As strains increase in 1951, and the costs of resistance mount, many forces are working to tear the free nations apart.

The first force is Soviet Russia. It is unprincipled and astute. It directs peace campaigns and campaigns of aggression. It combines terror and cajolery. It exploits the conservatives resistance to the future and the radicals rejection of the past. It preys on poverty, unpreparedness, disunity and indecision within the free nations. It spreads corrosion through every crack and crevice of the free world.

A second force of disunity is led by divisionists overseas. The socialist who places socialism before defense; the tory who will not co-operate with a socialist government; the nationalist who demands outrageous concessions; the internationalist who lives in the past; the defeatist who prefers surrender to resistance; and the neutralist who seeks to save his own skin—all are playing the Soviet game. All of them seek to unload on the United States the responsibility for halting Soviet imperialism. But the United States will not accept sole responsibility and rightly insists that the nations of Europe and Asia share the burden of collective security.

A third force of disunity is led by divisionists within this nation. We leave aside the shabby little band of domestic Communists. Russia relies on far more important groups to do its work.

The first main group working to break up the partnership of free peoples is made up of isolationists and appeasers. They want the US to dishonor its signature on the North Atlantic Pact and to crawl back to our own shores. They propose that we give Russia all Europe and yet hold Britain, 20 miles across the channel. They insist that we greatly strengthen Stalin and yet base our hopes for peace on his collapse. The truth is that if Europe should fall to Stalin, Africa and the Near East would be lost, and Asia, cut off from its traditional ties to democracy and the West, would soon follow. America would be left entirely alone.

Americans understand this, and in its open and honest form, they will recognize and reject the Hoover doctrine in 1951. Yet in its concealed and dishonest form it will be pressed by its supporters in the 82nd Congress, who with anti-Communist phrases on their lips will move to deny Europe and Asia the aid and encouragement that can save free nations now and prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of American lives later on. That is the danger.

The second main group in the US that aids Russia is the group led by *Life* magazine with its hysterical slogan *World War Now!* The first group seeks to isolate the US. The second group makes it easy for Stalin to isolate us. Either these men are corrupted by hatred and want war, or they are corrupted by cynicism and pretend that world war is raging because they believe that Americans are incapable of a sustained effort of unselfishness and sacrifice except in wartime. Either way, when they discard world peace like a dirty dishrag they are playing Stalin's game. For the peoples of the world who have suffered bombardment and occupation and famine know the difference between today's conflict and atomic war, even if publishers on Fifth Avenue do not. They know that a third World War will leave the world in ashes and they will reject any partnership with a nation whose leaders seem reconciled to war.

Americans also will reject this policy when it is honestly and openly presented. Again its supporters will press it in a concealed form in 1951. Conciliation will be identified with appeasement; strength with refusal to negotiate; firmness with reckless moves of involvement in China; realism with the fiction that Chiang Kai-shek is the ruler of China. Truman and Acheson retreated very far before these pressures in 1950. So the US forfeited a part of the leadership our soldiers earned in Korea by drifting toward an unlimited war with China despite the bitter opposition of our allies and the UN. If we continue to pursue our own course in Asia, regardless of our military weakness and the wishes of our allies, then the way may be opened for Russia's conquest

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of all Europe. Other free nations must not unload on us all the responsibility for resisting aggression. We must seek to share the responsibility by thinking and acting as part of a UN team.

We came to realize in 1950 that strength was vital for peace. The test in 1951 will be to define what we mean by strength. Do we mean the limited strength of the United States, or do we mean the strength of all free peoples? Do we measure strength by military divisions alone, or do we measure it also by economic stability, social justice, political liberty and all the conditions and values that men live for, work for and fight for?

One great test will be to meet the appeasers with the cry of *No Retreat!* A second test will be to remember and cherish the differences between democratic principles and Soviet practices. We need strength. But our concern is not with strength for its own sake. We want strength as a means to justice and to peace. We cannot use strength to impose injustice, or foreclose on negotiation for peace. The price of world leadership in 1950 was courage. In 1951 it will be also magnanimity, and wisdom and comradeship and self-restraint.

II. STRENGTH IN FREE NATIONS

ALL OVER the world, tensions and threats of aggression are mounting in 1951. The United States must act to halt aggression. But we cannot act alone.

We have not the wealth to buy the allegiance of embattled peoples. We have not the men to police the world alone. We have not the wisdom to shape all the policies of the United Nations.

Because we lack the strength to dominate the world, some Americans urge that we retreat to our own shores.

The certainty that such a course would lead to our defeat is proved by a few facts on steel and oil, the two basic materials of war.

The Communist nations produce 28 million tons of steel, or 14 percent of the world's supply.

The United States produces 90 million tons of steel, or 46 percent of the world's supply.

The other free nations produce 70 million tons of steel, or 40 percent of the world's supply.

The Communist nations produce 838,000 barrels of crude oil a day, or eight percent of the world's supply.

The United States produces 5.5 million barrels, or 52 percent of the world's supply.

The other free nations produce 4.2 million barrels, or 40 percent of the world's supply.

Even standing alone our production is high. Yet our disadvantage, standing alone, is clear. For most of our production is used to maintain civilian standards, while Communist governments by forcing down standards of life to the limits of human exploitation concentrate a major proportion of their resources on military use.

The Defense of Europe

Without the free nations, we are doomed. Our policy must be to strengthen the free world, by helping to build its defenses, and by overcoming its underlying weaknesses that open the way to aggression and revolution. We start in Western Europe.

Two hundred and seventy million people, highly skilled, and rich in tradition and prestige live in Western Europe. They produce 46 million tons of steel a year and 349 million tons of coal. They are still the great prize of Soviet imperialism.

In violation of international treaties, large armies are being trained in Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania to attack Tito, the "insolent dwarf" who defied Stalin. Polish armies are being prepared under a Soviet commander for action in Northern Europe. So are 70,000 East German soldiers. In France and Italy the Communist parties collect contributions from poor people of every persuasion, giving them receipts which entitle them to "protection" when the Red armies arrive.

Against the 180 Soviet divisions, and the 100 satellite divisions, that stand on European borders the West can muster 60 divisions at most, of which 32 under Tito are equipped with Russian weapons. Yet the problem is not one of arms alone. From Frankfurt, Drew Middleton writes in the New York *Times:*

> If the present terrible inadequacy of the Western forces in Germany is to be changed for the better then the main burden must be borne by all of Europe that hopes to be saved. . . . Unless the European peoples can be convinced that only through manning their defenses can they maintain their political and cultural freedom no amount of arms and material will make much difference in the long run.
>
> There may be just time to close the ranks and man the defenses. If this is done there may be no war. If it is not war by bits and pieces all over the globe until finally the ancient edifice of European civilization is brought crashing to the ground is certain.

In 1951 then, the US must follow two programs in Europe.

First, to back European rearmament with enough man-

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power, material and economic aid to prevent ungovernable inflation or unopposed invasion.

Second, to promote a long-range solution for Europe that will give the peoples of Europe something to live for, work for and fight for.

Under the North Atlantic Treaty, the US, Canada and Western Europe are pledged to build integrated forces capable of holding Europe. Britain is raising her armed forces in Europe from two divisions to five; Benelux from two divisions to seven, France from five divisions to twenty, Italy from eight divisions to ten. It is proposed that when a European armed force is created, it should include ten divisions raised by West Germany. To back this force, the US intends to hold ten divisions in Europe. Drew Middleton writes:

> To deter the Russians . . . immediate United States reinforcement is necessary. One new United States division actually in Germany would do more for European morale than 15 German divisions on paper.

Manpower is the first need. Material and economic aid comes next. The US in recent years has spent two billion dollars a year in total military expenditures for every division we have maintained and while Europe's overheads will be less, the costs are still tremendous.



The nations of Western Europe are authorizing record military budgets to meet the costs of rearmament. But Western Europe, and above all Great Britain, is an industrial workshop into which more must be poured, if more is to be produced. With the help of the Marshall Plan, Western Europe has regained the ability to export enough to pay for its essential imports in normal times. As Western Europe converts its industries to rearmament however, its need for imports will mount while its capacity to export will be reduced. It is in our self-interest to help make up that gap. Part of our aid will be in weapons and raw materials for rearmament supplied under the Military Defense Assistance Program. A further part must be in continuing economic aid. The reason is that Western Europe is still close to the margins of economic subsistence, and handicapped by grave shortages in consumption goods. Without economic aid to keep some goods in her store windows, Europe's defense effort will be paralyzed by ungovernable inflation.

In 1950, $5.3 billion was authorized by Congress for the MDAP to be used over a flexible time schedule in 1951. In the fiscal year 1952, which the present Congress must provide for, our defense planners estimate that Western Europe will need $2 to $2.5 billion in economic aid to maintain minimum living standards, and $7 to $8 billion in military equipment and supplies to meet the goals set by the North Atlantic Chiefs of Staff.

These are large sums. But they are small in comparison to our total defense effort and infinitesimal compared to the $1,400 billion spent in winning the Second World War. This program can help to prevent war. Yet it is certain to be fought by the isolationists in the 82nd Congress. The resulting battle will be critical for every American citizen. For if the isolationists win, our partnership with Western Europe will be crippled and possibly broken.

One argument alone is effective against aid granted to present day Europe: in its present anarchical and divided state, Europe cannot be defended. Europeans know this, and the resulting sense of futility is the underlying reason for defeatism and apathy in Europe.

Great strides have been made toward economic unity in Western Europe. Further strides are being taken now toward military unity under General Eisenhower. The Schuman Plan is near completion and offers the basis of a lasting partnership between France and a democratic Germany. But the dramatic stroke of political unification which can sustain Eisenhower and raise the spirit of Europe is still to come. We doubt if Acheson's policy of binding the US to a divided Europe can stand against Hoover's policy of abandoning a divided Europe. We believe that the one safe policy for the US in 1951 is to

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bind the US to a united Europe by making unification US policy. We should endorse central institutions for Europe, and we should give our aid to these institutions.

Britain, with its Commonwealth ties, may not join this union. Our partnership with Britain which is the basis for the survival of all free nations should be reaffirmed once and for all by the governments of Britain and the US. Yugoslavia may also feel it necessary to remain outside a European union. Yugoslavia should be brought into the common defense plans of the North Atlantic Community through MDAP aid, and through a new pact by which the North Atlantic nations guarantee the integrity of Yugoslavia's frontiers against Soviet or satellite attack. Yugoslavia is first on the list of Soviet victims in Europe. If it falls, Europe is almost indefensible. For that reason the re-equipment of Tito's 32 divisions comes far higher on the list of priorities than the creation of a small, unreliable and provocative German armed force.

The Defense of Asia

In Western Europe military power is needed to avert aggression. In Asia, as Justice William O. Douglas has written, "military power alone will never stop the Communist advance." In a brilliant article in *Look* he wrote:

> What is happening in Asia is a series of revolutions against aggression and poverty. The Communists whip them and accelerate them. But their origin is not Communist and they cannot be killed off.
>
> They call for a political approach to the problem more than a military plan of action. They demand a great American program to support the aspirations of the Asiatic peoples, and to help them achieve those aspirations as we achieved ours in 1776. . . .
>
> . . . The peoples of the Middle East and South East Asia are today in the midst of revolutions founded on complaints as specific as ours were then and as important. These complaints are in part the following:
>
> Ownership of land by a few . . .
>
> Absence of schools for children.
>
> A great lack of doctors, clinics and hospitals.
>
> A system of taxation under which millionaires pay little or no taxes.
>
> Governments that are corrupt and elections that are rigged.
>
> These are the great burning issues in the villages from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. . . . And the tragic fact is that in most of the countries in this area . . . the only party that offers reform is the Communist Party. That gives the Communists a tremendous advantage. They operate in a vacuum. They gain adherents merely by default. . . . So the Red tide swells and swells . . . . Every nation in which Russia gains a political victory produces an army to fight her battles. So Russia gains in strength while the democratic world becomes steadily weaker.
>
> That is why the problem of reversing the trend is primarily a political problem. . . . Platitudes about democracy are not enough. . . . Our position must be clear on land reform, unemployment insurance, price control, taxation, food rationing and all the other issues that are critical in the area. . . .

No truer statement could be made of the need for a new policy in Asia. Yet land reform needs more than moral support. Without technical assistance and financial aid, the peasant in Asia who becomes a landowner soon falls into debt and loses all his land to the money lender.

We must help provide the technical assistance and credit needed for reform. In particular in Korea, the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, India, Pakistan and the Arab states, land reform is vital. The nature of needed reforms, and the need for financial support varies nation by nation.

In the Near East, where populations are stable, dollar reserves are adequate and governments are apathetic, the main need is for technical assistance to back projected reforms.

In India and Pakistan where an intolerable gap is opening up between rising population and static production immediate aid is needed to halt inflation in food prices, and to raise industrial production.

Many Asian governments are committed to ambitious schemes for progress. The Colombo Plan summarizes the development projects undertaken by India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya on which the stability of these nations depends. Their total cost is $5 billion of which $3 billion will be internally financed. Seven hundred million will be met by Britain. The rest represents imports needed for agricultural implements, mining machinery, transportation facilities and equipment for hospitals and schools. It can only come from the United States.

It is for the Administration to place the US behind progress in Asia. The Congress can support the program in two main ways. The first way is to raise the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank from its present limit of $1.5 billion to $5 billion. The second way is to appropriate funds for aid. Based on the recommendations in the Gordon Gray report, approximately $500 million will be required in fiscal 1952 for emergency relief in South Asia. An additional $400 million will be needed for economic development. Military supplies of about $600 million will be necessary if South Asia is to withstand Chinese-supported attacks. To raise productivity and to improve transportation, education and health, a further $500 million will be needed to assure the future of other underdeveloped nations in the free world.

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III. STRENGTH IN ARMS

THE COMMUNIST invasion of South Korea revealed a low state in our military readiness which shocked the American public. What happened, they asked, to all the billions appropriated for the armed forces in the past five years? If those sums could not provide adequate armed forces why were we not informed? Sadly we realized that although our Armed Forces were several times larger than ever before in peace, they were inadequate to meet the world-wide responsibilities assumed by the United States.

Of the three services the Navy proved to be in the best condition. It was in readiness and it mobilized rapidly and smoothly for action. The Air Force had concentrated on strategic bombing and was inadequately prepared for a war in which all air operations were tactical. It had no designed close-support aircraft and its fighters proved to be too fast for effective close support of troops. Its medium and heavy bombers were not the most appropriate machines for bombardment of numerous small targets. Nevertheless the Air Force showed an astonishing capacity to concentrate for action. Its aircraft were flown from all over the world to Japan.

It was the Army which bore the principal burden in Korea and which was the least ready. That was no new experience for the US. Our peacetime Army has never been maintained in readiness to enable it to undertake other than small police operations. Its forces have habitually been divided between overseas garrisons and units at home too small to serve as a base for expansion.

It was a year and a half after recognition of a state of war, in World War I, before United States forces participated in substantial numbers in the fighting. It was more than two years, after the partial mobilization of October, 1940, before United States troops landed in North Africa. But today our troops are in the front lines in Germany and Austria, and if war breaks out in Europe, we shall be involved from the start. The Army however failed to modify its structure and its plans.

How far the Army miscalculated can be seen by the situation at the outbreak of the Korean War. Our four divisions in Japan had been skeletonized with one company missing in each battalion and one battalion short in each regiment. This left the four divisions available to General MacArthur at something over half strength. The Second Infantry Division stationed in the United States had a turnover in personnel of 130 percent in the year before it was sent to Korea and was 60 percent effective for combat. The Third Infantry Division, also in the United States, had a strength of 5,000 as opposed to a full-strength division of 18,000 men.

To make up for this general weakness all the organizations remaining in the United States were stripped to send experienced crews to the Far East to build up the divisions there. Consequently there is almost no experienced personnel to train our new divisions.

A second major failing has shown up in home defense. The Soviet atomic explosion and the aggression in Korea awakened the United States to our total lack of defense against air attack. We realized suddenly that if our B-29s can bomb the Soviet Union, the Soviet copy of the B-29 can bomb the United States.

The Air Force organized an air defense command over two years ago and then disbanded it. It has now been re-established, but a headquarters is not a defense. James Forrestal took the first step in providing for civil defense by appointing the Hopley Committee to report on civil defense needs. The recommendations of the Hopley Committee, which now are fully confirmed, were attacked at the time by one of the more irresponsible commentators, and the President shelved the report. We have lost two years in starting a civil defense program.

As the new year commences the Navy is well advanced in its program of mobilization. Planned naval strength is 850,000 including 166,000 Marines. Two battleships are being commissioned with complements of over 3,000 men each. This is enough personnel to man 30 destroyers. One wonders about the naval mentality which gives precedence to these obsolete behemoths over means of defense against submarines. Or does the Navy think that manpower and money are unlimited?

Air Force expansion plans call for an ultimate 84 groups and 917,000 men, more than double the strength at the outset of the Korean War. The growth of the Air Force is limited by the need for new equipment.

The Army is preparing to expand from 600,000 men to 1.3 million: That is from the equivalent of 11 divisions to the equivalent of 24 divisions. This compares with 36 Army divisions at the time of Pearl Harbor.

As our armed forces accelerate their growth at a time of increasing scarcity and need, they face five major problems of organization:

- The extent and speed of mobilization.
- The division and best use of military manpower.
- The reorganization of reserve forces.
- The development of adequate air defenses.
- The completion of unification.

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The extent and speed of mobilization should depend upon the imminence of war. If we have reason to believe that the Soviet leaders have chosen to invade Western Europe this year, then full mobilization with its confusion, its waste and its high human cost is in order. If there are no convincing signs pointing to war in the near future then an orderly mobilization, building up forces in being to a strength that can be maintained over a period of years, together with improvement in the mobilization base to provide for a rapid expansion of forces, is a much sounder policy.

On balance, war seems unlikely this year. We still have a major deterrent in our atom bomb superiority. The Soviet Union still has overwhelming ground superiority in Europe. Stalin may seek to gain the fruits of aggression while avoiding counterattacks on Russia by thrusting forward satellite armies in Korea, China, Indo-China or Europe. But he is still careful not to become directly involved.

Before general war is risked the question of Yugoslavia must be settled in the Soviet favor. Yugoslavia is to Stalin what Czechoslovakia was to Hitler—a dangerous enclave in his sphere, an enemy on his flank. Before the Soviet or Polish troops swing down through Germany, Stalin must try to forestall the counterswing of Yugoslav troops across the Hungarian plains. The real test for Europe will probably come when Stalin moves through the satellites to reintegrate Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere. This may be the time and place of the new Munich and the decline of the West, or of the stand which could save the West.

Viewed in this light, war is not imminent. Our military task is to strengthen ourselves and our allies for the long pull. We should perfect the training of our reserve forces and expand them so that rapid mobilization of large forces is possible. We should expand our armaments industry. We should stock the arms, ammunition and equipment for full mobilization. This is the plan supported by the Defense Department. We support this plan as against the hysterical cries for unlimited forces now.

The division of manpower is the second major problem in military planning. Manpower is the critical shortage for continued maintenance of large military forces. About 1.1 million men become 19 years of age each year. Of these about 750,000 are acceptable to the armed forces. If two years of military service is required, this provides a pool of 1.5 million men. To this may be added one million military career men allowing a total force based on two years service of 2.5 million men. Increase of service to two and one half years would raise this to over 2.8 million men. For the next two or three years there are also available the classes which did not have military service during the past war. Perhaps two million are available from these groups. This temporary bonus of manpower will permit attainment of the President's objective of 3.5 million men in the armed forces without recalling veterans.

Manpower limitations demand the utmost economy in the use of men, and it is precisely here that the military services are most wasteful. Each is attempting to grab the largest possible complement for itself. Each mans its organizations on a luxury scale. Each refuses to make use of men with minor physical defects or low mental ratings. Each by various means discriminates against manpower from minority groups.

In the competition between the services for manpower the Navy and Air Force have been able to weight the scales in their favor. The Navy, already many times larger than all the other navies in the world, is still expanding. The Navy feels, in spite of unification, that it must have within its control all the means to do everything which it may be called upon to do. So it commissions battleships, provides its own army with its private air force, and provides equipment to duplicate Air-Force missions.

The Air Force build-up to 917,000 also contains the germ of fighting its private war. The composition of this 84-group force has not been made public, but if the past is indicative there will be excessive emphasis on the strategic air force and inadequate attention to tactical aircraft, both in numbers and in types.

The Army has lagged in the competition for manpower. The result is that we now have and shall continue to have an unbalance in the defense establishment in favor of the glamorous Air Force and comfortable Navy at the expense of the necessary, unpleasant and dangerous ground forces.

Some amelioration of the problem could be obtained by reducing the luxurious use of manpower in all the services. To maintain and provide combat support of a division of 18,000 men the Army uses an additional 42,000, making a division slice of 60,000. The Marine division slice is 83,000. Comparable computations (using the estimated air-frame weight of an air group to determine proportions) indicates that a B-36 group has a group slice in the Air Force of approximately 19,000 men. In other words 19,000 men are required for all purposes to provide and maintain an end product of 30 B-36s. The comparable figure for a fighter group of 75 planes would be about 3,500 men. Due to the variety of its ships and planes, it is difficult to compute a comparable figure for the Navy, but one can be certain that its establishment is no less wasteful.

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Each of the services can justify its use of manpower. But other nations are able to get a greater end product of fighting forces with the same number of men. The Soviet division slice is estimated to be about 20,000 men including a fighting force of 11,000 men. It has been able to maintain about twice as many active airplanes with the same manpower as our Air Force. We feel that if the services themselves cannot find a way to obtain a greater proportional fighting end product from their manpower, then a competent civilian committee should be appointed to do the job for them.

All services refuse to use men with minor physical defects, thus swelling the ranks of the draft exempt. It adds to the complexity of handling personnel to have a group who can perform only limited service. But the fact is that three-quarters of the personnel of the Army and still larger proportions of the Navy and Air Force do not need to meet the physical fitness standards of fighting men. Some of the hesitancy to use limited-service personnel is due to the pension problem. Men with minor physical defects receive pensions if they can show that their condition has been aggravated in the service. But this is a problem for the Congress, and the services exceed their function when they refuse such men unless they actually cannot be used. The plain fact is that proper use of limited-service personnel would increase available manpower by more than a million.

In the division of skills and intelligence the Navy and Air Force are in a preferred position. By law the Army is required to use men with a general classification test score of 70 and above. The comparable score used by the Air Force is 80 and by the Navy 85. The result is that the Army is loaded with the men of low capacity who are not taken by the Navy and Air Force.

The reorganization of our reserves is the third major problem in military planning. The traditional United States Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve units are under strength and poorly trained. The result is that it takes at least seven months to call a Guard division into service and make it ready for combat while a new division can be organized and trained in nine months. In other words all the effort and expense put into the National Guard only represent a gain of two months in mobilization.

This anachronism is more serious because Universal Military Training proposals are based on required service in the reserve forces or the National Guard upon completion of active duty. This means in effect that the United States will turn over these trained men to the often incompetent hands of state forces to deteriorate until their period of inactive service is ended.

The Organized Reserve is in competition with the National Guard. The two reserve systems exist side by side, and neither is effective. The Navy and Marines have developed a single effective reserve system. We believe that the Army and Air Force National Guard and Reserve Corps must be abolished in their present form and a suitable United States Army and Air Force reserve system established. This is in accordance with the proposals of the report by former Secretary of the Army, Gordon Gray, to the Secretary of Defense in 1948. The political power of the National Guard blocked any action on this report at the time.

The National Guard should be restored to its original role—a state force for home defense. Air defense requirements in the United States will probably take more than a million men. The National Guard, as a home defense force using over-age and physically rejected men, could provide this force without draining the physically fit of the nation from the combat forces.

Air defense is the fourth major problem of military planning. Until now the problem has been largely evaded.

There are obvious limits to an air-defense program. We cannot afford to lock up our steel production in deep shelters dug at every crossroads. We cannot afford to drain our manpower from the fighting forces for home defense. Air defense from its inherent nature can never be fully effective alone. The ultimate protection from air attack can be secured only when the bases from which it is delivered are captured or destroyed. For that reason the first measure of air defense is our bomber force. The next measure is to organize defensive action, and this we have not done. We have neither the warning service, the planes, the anti-aircraft guns nor the trained personnel needed for air defense. We even lack completed plans. This is a serious deficiency that demands prompt action.

Action starts with the protection of our critical target areas by combined anti-aircraft and fighter defenses. In front of our area defenses early warning devices and fighter protection must be provided. Still further in advance, warning systems are required in the Aleutians and the Atlantic. The so-called radar defense now being organized will provide only the early warning net of our air defense system.

The completion of unification is a fifth major problem to be solved. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have established unified commands all over the world except at home. Here in the United States, which needs real defense for the first time in its history, there is no overall commander. The greatest task of unification is the establishment of a United States defense command which can plan and use all the forces available.

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IV. STRENGTH IN PRODUCTION

THE DISTRIBUTION of our national budget in the next fiscal year will depend on how fast American industry can turn out weapons. Military requirements to equip and supply the forces needed for a convincing show of armed strength at every key point in the free world are now vastly greater than our present rate of production. The actual procurement of defense supplies for ourselves and our allies has lagged far behind the authorization of funds for this purpose in 1950. At the end of the year, only about $20 billion in defense goods had actually come off the production line, although $40 billion had been voted by Congress. The government's military and Bureau of the Budget planners have made their estimates for the next fiscal year on the basis of the slow rate of procurement in the past one. Sixty billion dollars worth of defense material is probably closer to the free world's needs for 1951-52 than the $40- to $43-billion appropriation the President is expected to ask for in his budget message. The guess of the government planners on what *can* be produced by American industry next year *should* be and *must* be proved low.

President Truman's total budget for the next fiscal year is expected to call for expenditures in the neighborhood of $70 to $73 billion: $40 billion for military purposes, $6 to $7 billion for economic and military aid to the other free nations, and the remainder for regular civil functions of the government. National spending, so heavily weighted on the military side, could distort the economy painfully. However, it is possible to mobilize at this rate and still keep the economy on a reasonably even keel. To do that the government must:

- Assure the most efficient use of all our resources.
- Speed industrial production and agricultural production.
- Stabilize wages, prices and profits.
- Fairly apportion the cost of our defense through taxes on a pay-as-we-go basis.
- Make effective use of every source of manpower and womanpower.
- Give priority to improving living conditions where the need is greatest.

Industrial Production

Since the armies of North Korea marched south across the 38th parallel, the United States has already passed through two stages of industrial mobilization. In the early days of our intervention against that aggression, President Truman requested certain standby powers in case it became necessary to mobilize the country for large-scale war. The 81st Congress grudgingly granted a watered-down and unworkable version of the defense authority the President asked. But the White House shied away from invoking even those regulatory powers it had during a summer of mounting tension and military setbacks.

It was not until the inevitability of strong controls over most phases of the economy became obvious even to the most reluctant members of the Administration that the President named Charles E. Wilson Defense Mobilizer with central authority over all defense preparations. But at the end of six months of war in Korea, the most important single operation for an effective mobilization still had not been established in Washington. No planning staff had been created to carry on a continuing inventory of our requirements and supply and to determine how our resources should be divided between immediate military needs, stockpiling, foreign aid, construction of key facilities and essential civilian needs. No one was determining day-by-day priorities or reconciling the demands of these competing fields. And no broad program for increasing the supply of the scarce commodities needed for a general expansion of production had been developed.

Expansion. America's greatest advantage over other nations is her proved ability constantly to swell industrial production. Our total output rose almost 75 percent between 1939 and 1944. The President's Council of Economic Advisers recently reminded the nation that "If this gain had been only one-half as great, we might have lost the war no matter what else we did." In the different situation we are today, where the expectation is not for immediate war mobilization but for a heavy defense buildup perhaps over many years, increasing our capacity for production in the future may be even more important than it was in the crisis of 10 years ago.

General Marshall and the Council of Economic Advisers are in agreement that it would be foolhardy for the US to choose the path of all-out military mobilization at this time. They agree that the sound course is to prepare for "a long pull." "We cannot expand total production anywhere near to the extent that we did between 1939 and 1944," the Economic Council says in its Fifth Annual Report, "because we had more slack resources in 1939 than we have now." But, the report goes on, "It should be possible to increase the total of private and

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public output by about 25 percent over the next five years."

Such a goal would not have been treated seriously a few years ago. When Leon Keyserling, the chief of the President's Economic "wise men," first suggested as a target a $300-billion level of national production by 1955, he was termed visionary. In the third quarter of 1950, the United States attained a gross national production of $285 billion. The $300-billion goal seems in sight by late 1951—not 1955. Much more phenomenal growth in productive strength is possible with a minimum of federal encouragement and direction.

But increasing the total power to produce by one-fourth is not enough. Without a well-planned program for expansion in certain key industries, mobilization may soon bog down disastrously. The $30-billion increase in our output this past year, for example, was much less than it might have been because there was not enough of the basic materials for all production to go around. Steel, aluminum and the metal industries generally operated at near-capacity in 1950—with the defense program still in low gear. To achieve the acceleration in our total production that is possible, government programs to assure larger supplies of a few scarce items are first essentials.

We need more iron ore and steel, copper, aluminum and nickel, electric power, railway cars, fertilizer and certain chemicals. The steel and aluminum industries, in return for generous tax amortization allowances from the government, have undertaken moderate expansions on their own. Steel will build new plants to produce 10 percent more within six years. Three to four times that much expansion in steel production is needed if our aim is to broaden the general industrial output. We need not 10 million more tons of steel in the next six years but 30 to 40 million more tons in the next two years.

To meet the goals of military production without setting aside the entire supply of US aluminum, we should plan at least to double last year's annual production of 1.4 billion pounds.

To make that much more aluminum per year alone will take perhaps 20 billion more kilowatt hours of electric power. The projected atomic energy program and other vast claims on present supplies of electric power demand the development of large new sources of public power. The long-delayed St. Lawrence Seaway project now becomes a necessity.

We need more freight cars if our railroads are not to fail miserably in moving raw materials to the factories and finished products to ships and consumers.

At least 50 percent more nitrogen, potash and phosphate is needed for fertilizer now that acreage allotments on corn and cotton have been lifted.

The government should continue to grant tax amortization benefits to companies in the shortage areas that are willing to expand, even if undue profits for the industry are the result. The only other stimulus government now has available is the $600-million revolving fund the last Congress established to aid "expansion of capacity and supply." A far larger sum is needed for this purpose, and the President should be authorized to use it in any way that will serve the purpose of expansion in the shortage industries—including the building and operation of government plants if needed.

Expanding production is the long-range answer to controlling inflation as well as to achieving maximum economic strength. But new steel and aluminum plants and new power facilities take years to build. Meanwhile, the existing supply of scarce resources will have to be carefully apportioned. It takes steel and other shortage materials to construct new plants and machines—steel that is in heavy demand for immediate weapons. The first decision for our economic planners is how much of our current resources to invest in building new productive capacity for the future. After that, the job is to curtail the use of scarce materials through priority, conservation, inventory and allocation controls. Cobalt is the only commodity under full government allocation to date. The primary materials which create the pressure on the industrial economy are still flowing freely to non-essential users. Complete allocation of non-ferrous metals, particularly copper and aluminum, of tin, steel, rubber, lumber and paper should go into effect at once to hold down inflation as well as to save resources. Priority orders such as have been issued in the case of cobalt are needed on manganese and other special alloying materials.

For lack of production controls on the construction industry, in particular, we are in danger of squandering our limited resources for housing. Many types of non-residential construction should be eliminated immediately. Building materials should go first into low-rent and

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defense housing to meet the needs of vital workers.

Our supply of some 70 strategic items, primarily minerals and metal, is dangerously low. The five-year stockpiling program to accumulate necessary amounts of natural rubber, wool and other fibers, chrome, copper, lead and zinc, manganese, tin and abacca which was begun in 1950 is already outdated in terms of anticipated production needs.

The 81st Congress appropriated $2.8 billion for stockpiling. Munitions Board Chairman John D. Small is now working on plans which will probably require $5 billion more to carry out and which may still prove to be too conservative a program.

Military conversion does not pose the problems to our industry that it did in 1940, when we were starting from scratch. The shipbuilding industry, for example, has mothball fleets which can be reconditioned. In some fields, however, such as in the production of jet engines, electronic and fire control equipment, where great advances in technology have been made in recent years, a full switch-over from domestic production will be required. Conversion of the entire television and radio industry will probably be needed almost immediately.

But conversion can be selective. Government economists believe that the US could increase its military expenditures another $10 billion, or 20 percent over what is planned for the coming year, without full mobilization and without reducing present standards of living appreciably. They believe that if necessary the United States could devote $100 billion to preparedness without extreme hardship to the civilian population. But it is unrealistic to think that we can continue to raise the general standard of living in the US or even hold it at present levels if we must sustain such military expenses for a long period.

A military preparedness program of the kind the Joint Chiefs of Staff say that we must have for protection will require sacrifices from the whole population. If our economic life is properly directed and the burden equitably divided, however, the price need not be more than Americans have paid before for their way of life.

Outlook for Agriculture

American farmers reaped such bumper crops last fall that, despite the increased demand brought on by the war in Korea, the US today has potatoes, corn and wheat in quantities which would have meant resort to burning or dumping in 1949. Restricted production, crop destruction and rigid marketing quotas are now things of the past, however. Farmers are being asked to aim for new records in 1951 and beyond.

Last year was our third-biggest farm production year, exceeded only by 1948 and 1949, years of large agricultural surpluses during which net farm income continually declined from its 1947 peak of $18 billion. Large crops and improved prices in the last six months of 1950 reversed this trend, and sent both farm income and production up. Today food products and the goods that are made from them are the one area in which the US appears able to supply the foreseeable demands of both the military and civilian economy. Agriculture has for several years been supplying a prosperous domestic market and exporting large amounts abroad while still producing well under capacity. In 1951 government officials expect to remove major production controls and give farmers the green light to produce all the wool, cotton, wheat, corn and meat they can. Under the Brannan Plan formula which is now being adopted under the pressure of war demand, 1951 farm production can be more than enough to meet increasing needs.

But the entire US farm policy, an accumulation of decades of piling special subsidies on special treatment, must be brought up to date for the possibly long mobilization effort ahead. We should consider:

1. Creation of a "Critical Materials Stocklist" to determine what crops may be short, what remedies are needed and what production and control measures are necessary to meet the situation.
2. Channeling of government aid only to farmers producing vital materials. The parity formula should either be brought to a 1950 basis or temporarily abandoned.
3. Extending government aid for creation of more private storage space.
4. Planning to ensure that farmers will have the vital resources to boost production: enough farm labor, fertilizer, and insecticides.
5. Encouraging scientific research, further mechanization of farms, and continuation of land conservation programs.

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Manpower

Once the temporary unemployment that will occur in the next few months as a result of conversion from civilian to military production is ended, a shortage of industrial manpower is expected to be the major problem of mobilization. As minimum preparation for solving it, we should promptly federalize the public employment and unemployment insurance systems of the country. The President should again insist on repeal of the Taft-Hartley law and the enactment in its place of a fair labor-relations stabilization policy.

The US labor force today is nearly nine million greater than the 54.7 million men and women employed in 1941. More than half that gain has been in womanpower. When military production began in earnest in 1942, industry had more than four million unemployed upon which to draw. About three million women went into war jobs in that first year alone. Today the Defense Manpower Director estimates that the pool of unemployed in the US has shrunk to less than two million. The proportion of women entering the labor force this next year, therefore, will have to be far greater than it was even in 1942. Day nurseries and kindergartens and other public services that will make it possible for women to work without damaging their family life will be needed.

The other large reserve of labor power we drew upon to perform the production miracles of World War II consisted of unskilled, under-employed Negroes and members of other minority groups whose potentialities had not been tapped because of widespread industrial discrimination. President Roosevelt appointed a Fair Employment Practices Commission to prevent the waste of manpower resulting from the barring of workers by employers and unions because of the color of their skin.

The World War II FEPC had many limitations, but it accomplished a great deal in establishing patterns of equal employment in defense plants in both the North and the South. Although it possessed no punitive powers, the FEPC enforced its policies effectively by working with federal contract agencies and through mediation.

President Truman should use his defense powers and emergency funds to re-establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission under the Defense Production Administration with all the powers of the World War II FEPC.

The government should set a national example by enforcing the fine print provisos in most government contracts prohibiting any discrimination in employment in the course of fulfilling the contract. These clauses are largely disregarded today. Government agencies should be ordered to enforce them and to set up test court cases to lay a stronger basis for FEPC action.

At the same time, efforts to push permanent FEPC legislation in Congress must be continued in order to give full status to a policy of economic equality.

II

As the military portion of the national budget expands, the forces which have opposed the welfare programs of the New Deal and Fair Deal throughout the years will redouble their attacks on the ground that these programs contribute to inflation. There are economies which can and should be made in government while it is necessary to hold spending to a minimum. But we cannot allow health services, school systems and decent homes to be labeled "non-essentials." Defense mobilization will strain community facilities dangerously unless the federal government assists in creating new ones.

Housing. The provision of comfortable housing at reasonable cost in areas where increased numbers of workers are needed for defense jobs will do more than an army of personnel procurement experts to solve manpower problems. The 135,000 low-priced homes due to have been built this year under the program passed by the 81st Congress has been cut to 30,000 under recent construction limitation orders. That policy obviously must be reversed, and an opposite one adopted.

The authority to control rents in every area where a shortage of housing exists must be re-established to prevent landlord profiteering on the emergency.

Education. Certainly the training of our young people plays an important part in the strength of the nation. Experts estimate that we should spend $15 billion during the next 10 years on school construction alone to meet the needs of a steadily expanding school population. The Census Bureau estimates that the number of the nation's children will rise by 10.5 million between now and 1960; the resulting increase will require 520,000 new classrooms and 750,000 newly-trained teachers.

Health and welfare. Our critical shortage of doctors was sharply emphasized when virtually all of the nation's physicians, dentists and veterinarians under 50 years of age were ordered to register for the draft on January 14. We will need 13,000 doctors to care for the 3.5-million man army now being planned. An adequate number of doctors must be reserved for the civilian population, in the event of an attack on the United States. Federal aid for medical training, defeated last year under pressure by the American Medical Association, and more funds for constructing hospitals and clinics, are now as essential as legislation for planes and weapons.

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V. STRENGTH IN STABILITY

MUCH OF THE strength America gained through production in 1950 was dissipated through inflation. Prices affecting military procurement have risen so rapidly that funds appropriated by Congress for given military equipment sometimes failed by as much as 30 to 40 percent to cover the purchase price when those products came off the assembly line. The $4.5 billion in new taxes, voted by Congress last September, was eaten up by the rise in prices of products going into the military program before collection of those new taxes had begun.

Consumer prices have never really stopped rising since 1942. They are up 57 percent since the start of that year. The Index of Consumer Prices for moderate-income families now stands at 175 percent of the prewar level. Before automobile production was suspended in February, 1942, one could buy a Ford six deluxe sedan for a factory list price of $840 in Detroit. The government has now frozen the price for the new model of that car, with slightly bigger bumpers and better brakes, at $1410.

The general price level rose 18 percent in 1950. Department of Agriculture experts think food prices will go up another 10 percent in 1951. An economic stabilization official privately estimates that the whole cost-of-living index will rise 7.5 percent further this year.

Some of the conservatives who fought the hardest against granting President Truman even standby powers to control inflation last summer are now leading in the cry for a "vigorous" program of across-the-board price controls. Actually our first line of defense against inflation should be basic fiscal measures, taxes and credit curbs, as the President has consistently said. Price controls are also necessary. But across-the-board price controls, without strong fiscal measures, would not stop inflation; they would merely drive it underground.

Taxes. Solid public support for the costly program of national defense upon which we are entering will depend heavily on how fairly taxes to pay for it are levied. It would be intolerable to permit the outrageous profit-taking of recent years to continue while inflicting far heavier taxes on the low-income families. Net profits to industry, after all taxes were paid, averaged more than four times as much in the years 1946-49 as they did in 1936-39. They continued upward in 1950 to total more than $25 billion after taxes. Yet, with defense expenditures soaring, corporations are paying smaller taxes in proportion to total tax receipts than at any time since 1936-39.

The excess-profits tax bill passed in the last hours of the 81st Congress permits corporations to keep 60 percent more of their profits on the basis of investment than the World War II excess-profits law allowed. The loopholes in this law should be closed enough to bring in double the $3 to $4 billion anticipated next year.

Regular corporate taxes can be raised to yield at least another $3 billion. If profits before taxes next year reach the $45- to $50-billion level expected, business could part with an extra $3 billion and still have more than its average of profits during World War II to invest in expansion. Government tax experts believe it would be very difficult to raise corporate taxes much above the approximate 55 percent rate which this would necessitate.

Once fairer taxes have been placed on business, the average taxpayer may assume with better grace the increased burden that must also fall on him. Present taxes are expected to yield $52 to $55 billion in revenues next year. On the basis of a total budget of around $70 billion, and no new taxes, this would leave approximately an $18-billion gap between income and spending. With incomes as high as they are today and the prospect that heavy defense spending must continue for many years, pay-as-we-go is the only sound budget policy for the nation to follow. If expenditures rise so fast that they outdistance taxes even if passed promptly, or if the increase in tax rates required to pay as we go would be too great for people to accumulate on short notice, this may not be feasible. But pay-as-we-go should be our goal until it is proved absolutely hopeless.

Some economy can be made in government. Corporations can and should provide another $5 to $6 billion in regular and excess-profits taxes.

Another $2.5 billion can be raised from excise taxes if they are pressed heavily. Present excises which now range from seven to 15 percent would have to go to 25 percent on such durable goods as automobiles.

Even so, another $8 to $10 billion would have to be raised in taxes on personal income to close the inflationary gap completely. Individual taxes should probably be increased a flat five percent next year. That would produce another $5 billion. It would mean paying higher taxes than we paid at any time during World War II, and start the tax rate for the average man at 25 percent.

Still more could be raised from personal incomes by lowering the present $600 exemption allowance, which means so much to large families today. In the whole history of the income tax, however, there has never been

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a reduction in the exemption; the trend has always been in the opposite direction, and it is unlikely that Congress would agree to reverse it.

Even with the above increases a substantial gap between federal expenditures and revenue would still remain. Some form of general sales tax would be required to fill it completely. The Administration naturally hesitates to adopt a tax method so long associated in the public mind with reactionary policies and is continuing to look for other methods with which to fill in the $5- to $10-billion gap that will remain without a sales tax.

Credit. Even with very stiff taxes, tighter curbs on credit will be necessary if spending is to be cut down. The great burst of consumer buying following the Korean outbreak was largely on credit.

During the first six months after Korea credit for such things as automobiles, television sets and household appliances increased $842 million, compared with a decline of $53 million in the same period of 1949. Installment credit was expanded by $1.2 billion as compared with $523 million in the first half of 1949.

Credit buying has dropped since new restrictions were imposed in September and October, but a goods-hungry public is already discovering ways to get around the requirement of larger down payments and shorter credit periods by juggling charge accounts.

Prices and Wages. The news of higher taxes to be at all palatable must be accompanied with concrete evidence that prices are finally being held in check. Without price controls business cannot be prevented from shifting its added tax load to consumers.

The need to prepare for controls on prices and wages was apparent as soon as the Korean War began. Moves should have begun then to stabilize the cost of living by orderly steps: setting prices on materials and manufacturing components, and moving gradually toward across-the-board controls as needed.

But the chance to halt inflation early has been lost forever. Wholesale prices of all commodities leveled off briefly in the late fall after the big initial jump of last summer but have now begun to climb again. These latest increases in the price of basic materials have not yet been fully reflected in the prices of products in the stores. The practical problem now is not whether we can roll prices back to June levels and make them stick. No economists in the government seriously believe that is possible. The only question is whether current rises in raw materials costs can be kept from reflecting themselves at retail.

The machinery for establishing and enforcing price ceilings has just begun to be built. It will be 60 to 90 days before an enforcement organization capable of administering any considerable number of controls will be in running order. Between now and then, however, the Price Stabilization Agency can relieve some of the pain for consumers by freezing prices on a few of the commodities which are causing the greatest inflationary pressure. To be fair and effective, price controls should then be extended as rapidly as administratively feasible to include food prices, rent, housing sales and all other important elements in the cost of living.

The Defense Production Act will have to be amended to make this possible. Title IV must be broadened to give the President power to set prices on agricultural products at below parity and to regulate speculation on the commodity exchanges. He must be authorized to require the continued production of low-priced items and to safeguard quality standards in manufacturing. The mandatory tie-in of wage stabilization with price control, industry by industry, must be eliminated.

Wages. When the means exist for stabilizing the cost of living, it will be fair to ask that wage earners accept a freeze in their standard of living until we can increase total production or safely cut the size of the defense program. Except where existing inequities demand immediate remedy, wage increases that would necessitate price increases should be ruled out for the present.

Probably the only way workers can get a fair return for their labor at a time like this without running counter to the national interest is to take added benefits in bonds that are non-cashable until after the emergency. As soon as a fair balance can be struck between profits, prices and wages, wages should be generally stabilized at the current level in every industry where prices are stabilized. Present relationships which are inequitable should, of course, be subject to adjustment through a wage stabilization board of review, and failure by the government to maintain stability in the cost of living would have to be recognized as cause for adjustments in wages.

However, the general policy should be to prevent the supply of cash in workers' pockets from outrunning the supply of goods available for them to buy. At the same time, it is important to maintain the hard-won recognition of labor's right to premium pay for overtime work and regular wage increases for greater productivity on the job. This can be done by an agreement that both types of payments be made in deferred bonds, non-cashable until after the emergency. Time and a half could then be paid for hours worked in excess of 40 per week without promoting inflation, and wage increases of three percent per year, the accepted average improvement in worker productivity per year, could be left as a legitimate matter for collective bargaining.

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VI. STRENGTH IN SPIRIT

In this analysis of the State of the Union we have dealt largely with the economic effort our nation is called on to make. We have not attempted to discuss the state of the mind and spirit of the American people, or to emphasize the necessity of preserving attitudes of tolerance and compassion. That decision reflects no conviction that tolerance is less important now than in the past, or beyond restoration in the future. Tolerance is our one unique source of strength and our salvation. At the same time we feel that the intolerance that divided us in 1950 reflected a sense of insecurity and a loss of confidence among Americans, and that a program to restore confidence and win security will do more for tolerance than specific and surface treatments of a condition that is general and springs from far beneath the surface of our national life.

The program outlined in these pages is probably the minimum program necessary for survival. It is still far beyond any effort undertaken in time of peace. It assumes a degree of self-discipline none of us has yet shown. It demands a measure of world responsibility we are reluctant to accept.

This nation, after all, was born in revolt against Europe, and peopled by Europe's refugees. We survived in early years by avoiding entangling alliances. We fought the urge to imperialism later on. It is just 10 years since we gave up the effort to legislate our isolationism in the Neutrality Act.

A transformation so swift as that of the last five years cannot be experienced by a young people without mistakes in action and moments of doubt. Our system of democracy must always induce self-doubt. Our doubts are heightened by the lesson of two thousand years that all arms races end in war.

We have refused to surrender. And too often, in Europe and Asia our refusal to surrender has been seen as a desire to fight. That is unjust because, for all our noisy extremists, we still believe in peace.

Can we hold to that belief as we mobilize this nation? More than ever we need to remember the words of R. H. Tawney, "The destruction, by the effort to achieve victory, of the moral principles which alone can justify a war, is the commonest lesson of history."

What is our moral purpose in accumulating strength?

We believed once that we could work for a just world in harness with Soviet Communism. Later we came to believe that we could reach an agreement to disagree. We tried to negotiate during years of weakness and failed. We concluded that negotiation would be possible only when we achieved armed strength. Now we are building armed strength, and we are moving further from negotiation. We doubt now that the conflict between freedom and dictatorship can be negotiated or settled by anything other than force, unless it be time. We hope that if we can accumulate enough strength to make aggression unprofitable, we may endure through a long armed truce until the expansionist ambitions of Soviet Russia wear out.

At best that may be three generations or more. For the root cause of Russia's aggression is less the warped personality of an aged tyrant than the presumption of racial superiority held by a new breed of young Russians who have known nothing but Soviet rule.

Are we prepared for generations in which we wait day by day for world war and yet hold onto peace? The answer turns on the presence of alternatives to war.

In hardening ourselves to the bitterness of the Korean campaign, we have turned away from a search for the alternatives to war. And for as long as limited wars are profitable we can expect more Koreas to come. Yet our chance of checking the conflict short of unlimited war, and of shortening the years of danger depends on the alternatives we are able to offer to war. The impact of the alternatives we offer depends on our strength in resisting aggression, and our power of positive appeal.

We have offered to negotiate on general issues. We have proposed disarmament. We have mentioned once the kind of regime in Russia with which we could live at peace. So far we have failed, and the failure in part is due to the unimaginativeness of our recent proposals and the casual way in which they are advanced. Naturally we are discouraged. But while there is still some hope of settlement, we must go on trying, not only to reassure the free world but for our own sake. We are still ruled by moral principles, and as long as we express these principles then, no matter what wild charges of appeasement are hurled, we shall possess the strength of spirit that we need. But if we abandon the initiative in the search for world peace we will forfeit our sense of moral purpose. Then we will lose the support of free peoples and the last asset of the free world, our own self-respect.

For us, the great command of Pericles holds true today:

"Realize the power of Athens, and become her lovers, remembering that what made her great was courage, knowledge of what is right and a sense of honor in action."

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HAROLD L. ICKES: Heil Lequerica!

FRANCO, the Fascist dictator of Spain, has heaped coals of fire upon the heads of those who do not wish the US to associate with political gangsters. He has turned the other cheek. He has requited evil with good. He has blunted the edge of our uncharitableness by a display of "Christian" virtue and self-denial one does not ordinarily associate with a man who is in the bloody business of cruelly liquidating those who want to live as free men. He has bestowed upon us as his ambassador a former collaborator with Laval of France and an admirer of Adolph Hitler, a man than whom there is none dearer to his heart or more able to expound his high democratic ideals—José Lequerica.

How were we to know that Franco would overmatch us in generosity? Without waiting to be asked, he has given us Lequerica, crusader for liberty and democracy, whose good will was such that as Spanish Ambassador at Vichy at the time of Pearl Harbor he killed the goose that he had been fattening and spread a banquet to which he invited Japanese officials and other pacifists, to celebrate what he must have regarded as an important step toward the making of peace for the world.

Lequerica, to prove his gratitude for the recognition which Secretary Acheson had declared would not be given so long as Spain was the fascist state that it still is, is a native of the Basque provinces to which the Spanish Republic had granted autonomy and whose liberty loving president, José Aguirre, is in exile in New York, at least temporarily safe from Franco. As a Basque, Lequerica has been entitled to every distinction at the hand of his fellows. They contumaciously declined, from time to time, to elect him to the Cortes, to which he aspired. But there was another route by which to reach the same goal. Lequerica was a monarchist, and in some of the sparsely settled provinces deputies were appointed instead of being elected. Our hero's standing with the monarchists was such that he finally was appointed as a deputy to represent a remote constituency near Castille. At first, Lequerica, as a monarchist, opposed Franco. With his sharp tongue, he made himself obnoxious to his future benefactor. However, since they were blood brothers under the skin, there was a mutual appreciation. In time Lequerica became a staunch supporter of Franco; one might almost say his lackey.

Franco's appreciation of Lequerica grew until, when he wanted to do all that he could for the cause of freedom and world peace during World War II, he sent the wily Lequerica to Vichy as his ambassador. There, Lequerica promptly insinuated himself into an intimate friendship with Laval and other like-minded French patriots. Himself a high-minded and patriotic Francoist, it was probably coincidental that, after Lequerica began to operate at Vichy, Lewis Companys, president of Catalonia and a Republican who had sought asylum in France, was returned to Franco to be shot. Zugagoitia, Minister of the Interior during the Republic, did not fare so well when he was surrendered to Franco. He was hanged.

Lequerica insinuated himself into a close alliance with Hitler's secret police. He even pretended, convincingly it would seem, that the United States and other freedom loving countries that resisted Hitler were anathema to him. It was all very clever. He left nothing undone to pull wool over the eyes of Hitler. He even helped to persuade Hitler, through Hitler's own agents, that he and Franco wanted Hitler to win overwhelmingly in Europe and soon, so that he could then direct his attention to the United States. Not even Goebbels was so diabolically clever.

So well did he succeed in dissembling his love for democracy that the Loyalists in France and some befuddled people in the United States actually regarded both Lequerica and Franco as inveterate and secret foes, eager for a chance to strike openly at the allies. When the French Loyalists, with the help of the allies, took over from Marshal Petain, Lequerica reluctantly disguised himself as a Spanish Fascist and slipped back to Spain to seek the shelter that he had earned under the protecting wing of his fellow-democrat, Franco.

It is natural that, having availed himself of the priceless services of Lequerica at Vichy, Franco should want him to go through his entire repertoire here in Washington. Franco knows what this agent and bosom friend of his can do when he devotes his talents to the job. And Lequerica is fully aware of what Franco will expect of him.

If any reader has been confused in trying to understand the role that has been played by the principal actors in the recent Franco-State Department farce, it is quite understandable. The situation itself has been far from clear. Many moves have been made in the dark cellar of "diplomacy." But some light can and will be thrown into the dark places of the deal between the State Department and Franco that will appear in this space next week.

HAROLD L. ICKES

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LIFE IN COMMUNIST CHINA

by Leonard Constantine

THE PROCESS of establishing a constitutional form of government in China is being carried out with remarkable rapidity. This is the more impressive because of the contrast with the Kuomintang, which in 20 years of rule never passed beyond the period of "political tutelage" in spite of its repeated promises to introduce democratic government.

As each area of the country was liberated, a Military Control Bureau was appointed with the task of abolishing the Kuomintang political organizations, suppressing counter-revolution and establishing "revolutionary order." Until it is possible to hold elections, the bureau will convene local assemblies representing different occupational groups. This has already been done in most areas, and village, city and provincial assemblies have met. The members are not elected but are chosen by the government to represent their own occupational groups —so many to represent the teachers, the labor unions, business, etc. These assemblies discuss problems of local government and may make recommendations to the government, but their resolutions have no binding force.

As on the local level so it is on the national level. Ultimately there is to be an All-China People's Congress elected by universal suffrage. But until that is convened the People's Political Consultative Conference (PPCC) exercises its functions.

The PPCC met for the first time in Peking in September, 1949, when it approved all the Organic Laws of the People's Republic. All the political parties were Left-wing revolutionary organizations, the largest groups being the Communist Party, the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee and the Democratic League with 16 representatives each. The public organizations represented included labor unions, peasant unions, organizations of women, youth, students, cultural and scientific workers, teachers, social science workers, journalists, self-employed workers, overseas Chinese and national minorities—Moslems, Tibetans, Mongolians, Koreans and tribespeople. Of the seven representatives of religion five were Christians and two Buddhists. It would be difficult to compute how many members were Communists because in addition to the official Communist delegation many Communists attended as representatives of the different groups, but they were a minority of the whole conference.

In common with the usual practice in Communist countries, there is no mention in the Constitution of the real power in the country, the Communist Party. Behind all the assemblies and government councils stands the party as the real government. The party determines what subjects shall be discussed and what resolutions passed in the different assemblies. Non-Communists in the government are in a very uncomfortable position, for they know and everyone knows that they are dummies put there by the party to give the appearance of genuine democracy to the government.

Basic principles. The basic principles of the New Democracy are stated in three short pamphlets written by Mao Tse-tung between 1940 and 1949. These are "The New Democracy," which is the Bible of the Communist Revolution, written in January, 1940; "A United Government," written in 1945; and "The People's Democratic Dictatorship," published on July 1, 1949, to commemorate the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. A study of these documents is essential for an understanding of what is happening in China today, and their ideas have now been embodied in the Common Program or Constitution of the People's Republic, which was officially adopted in 1950.

"The New Democracy" begins by describing the two stages of the Chinese Revolution—the democratic revolution and the socialist revolution. The revolution is still in the first stage. This began really with the Opium War in 1840, when Chinese society was starting to change from a feudalistic society into a semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic society. As it proceeded the nature of the revolution has been changing. The revolution of 1911 was not a socialist revolution by the proletariat, but a democratic revolution by the Chinese capitalist class. The Russian Revolution, however, changed the nature of this and it became part of the New Democratic Revolution of the capitalist class—the Revolutionary Front which is part of the socialist revolution of the world proletariat. The leaders are the proletariat in the capitalist countries, and the oppressed peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries are their allies.

Capitalists can join in this revolution, for there is a great distinction between the capitalist class of China and that of other countries. China as a semi-colonial

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This is the second of a series of articles on life inside Communist China. The third will deal with taxation and public finance, private business, agriculture and the treatment of religion.

It is now possible to reveal the identity of the author of this series. He is the Rev. Leonard Constantine, professor of history for nearly 20 years at Huachang University at Wuchang. He left the country very recently.

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country has been under the pressure of imperialist forces; therefore, the Chinese capitalist class has been anti-imperialist, anti-bureaucratic and anti-militaristic, and this has enabled it to join with the proletariat and petty bourgeoisie to fight the common enemy. The New Democracy makes a distinction between what it calls national capitalists, who have a place in the New Democracy, and bureaucratic capitalists, who are to be exterminated. National capitalists are those who have created industries which are beneficial to the people's welfare, while bureaucratic capitalists, are those who have used their official positions in the government to create monopolies, and the term is usually restricted to the four big families —Chiang, Kung, Sung and Ch'en.

The New Democracy is to be a republic under the joint dictatorship of all the people who are anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist. The nature of this republic is expounded in "The People's Democratic Dictatorship." It is defined as a union of the working class, peasant class, petty bourgeoisie and national capitalists, under the leadership of the working class.

This New Democracy is different from any other form of democracy. It is different from the old-fashioned Western democracies because they are under the dictatorship of the capitalist classes; and it is different from the democracy of Soviet Russia, because that is under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The New Democracy is under the dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes and is the form of organization suitable for colonial and semi-colonial countries during a transitional period. In "The United Government" Mao says:

> A country of the New Democracy based on an alliance of several democratic classes is different in origin from the proletarian dictatorship of socialism. While China is in the period of the New Democracy, it cannot and ought not to establish the system of class dictatorship and one-party government. We have no right not to unite with other parties outside the Communist Party, whether they are social groups or individuals, so long as they choose to unite with the Communist Party and do not adopt an unfriendly attitude. China must form a Chinese system. For a long period we must create a special system which is entirely necessary and suitable for us, and we must discriminate between our system and that of Russia.

Economic policy is described very briefly in "The New Democracy," but more detail is given in "The United Government." Large-scale banks, industries and commercial enterprises which are too big for individuals to operate will be nationalized. Other capitalist production will be allowed to continue so long as it does not control the livelihood of the people. Light and heavy industries must be developed to change China from an agricultural to an industrial country. To do this large-scale capital is necessary. Where can this come from? There are two sources: the most important is the accumulated capital of the Chinese people, the other is borrowing from foreign sources.

We welcome foreign capital if it obeys China's laws and is helpful to China's economy. Enterprises which are profitable to both Chinese and foreigners will help China to obtain peace at home and abroad, and after there has been radical political and agrarian reform can create model light and heavy industries and modern agriculture. On this basis there is a wide use for foreign capital. A broken-down political organization and a poor Chinese economy is not only no use to the Chinese, it is also no use to foreigners.

As for agrarian policy, the land of the large landlords will be confiscated and distributed among peasants with little or no land, so as to bring about an even distribution of land. This is not the establishment of socialist farming, because land will be owned by farmers as their private property; it is the policy advocated by Sun Yat-sen of "the land to the cultivators"; it is the policy of the democratic revolution of the capitalist class and not that of the socialist proletariat, but only the Communist Party can see clearly its meaning and carry out this policy.

The Chinese Revolution is still in the first stage, the New Democracy. It is not yet time to practice socialism. The first stage will take a long time.

We are not Utopians; we should not forget our present actual conditions. Communists have present principles and future principles, or a minimum principle and a maximum principle; the one is the New Democracy, the other is socialism.

The final section of "The New Democracy" discusses its culture, which is distinct from both capitalist and socialist culture, for any culture is the reflection of the politics and economics of a given society. The policy of "wholesale Westernization" is condemned, and in the same way Marxism should not be followed slavishly.

Chinese Communists ought to treat Marxism in China in exactly the same way; that is, we ought to make a proper integration between the universal principles of Marxism and the concrete plans of the Chinese Revolution. In other words, whatever is useful must assume our national form. It should not be used as a subjective idea or as a universally applicable formula. Subjective and formal Marxism would be simply making Marxism in the Chinese Revolution ridiculous. People who have that kind of idea have no place in the ranks of the Chinese Revolution. Chinese culture ought to have its own peculiar form, and that peculiar form is national according to the principles of the Chinese democracy.

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Theory and practice. How far has Mao Tse-tung followed his own theories in building his New Democracy in China? It must be remembered that the position of the Communist Party changed greatly in the years from 1940 to 1949, and therefore each of the crucial articles by Mao had its own emphasis reflecting the situation at that time. As Mao says in "The United Government": "While our fundamental principles do not change over a long period in the stage of the New Democracy, our concrete proposals do change within each short stage." This is in accordance with the dialectical method; therefore any statement, for example on the attitude toward foreign capital, must be examined against the background of the particular time it was uttered.

In 1945 the main emphasis is still on the common front of all classes, but the attitude toward foreign countries has become more friendly and foreign capital is welcomed. When "The People's Democratic Dictatorship" was written in 1949, however, the great victory over the Kuomintang had been won, and the tone has become harder. Now the emphasis is on the predominating role of the workers and the Communist Party in the government; it is made quite clear that other classes play a subordinate role; Mao is now beginning to look beyond New Democracy toward the Communist State:

> China must advance steadily under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party from an agricultural country to an industrial country and from a New Democratic to a Socialist and Communist society, to eliminate classes and to realize world communism.

References to Russia are more direct and friendly and there is no doubt as to the camp to which China belongs. Therefore "The New Democracy" of 1940 should not be taken as the last word; it must be interpreted in the light of Mao's later writings.

It is sometimes claimed that the New Democracy is peculiarly Chinese and that it is not a product of Marxism. This is said by those who hope that Chinese Communism will develop on independent lines. But it is thoroughly in line with Marxist theory. I. Deutscher in his book, "Stalin," shows that up to 1917 neither Lenin nor Stalin thought a proletarian dictatorship was possible. The New Democracy is not Chinese in origin, and just as this policy was suddenly abandoned by Lenin in 1917 so it may be abandoned at any moment by the Chinese Communists according to the dialectics of the situation.

The system, however, sounds very reasonable and is calculated to allay the fears of the doubters. As a Chinese friend remarked to me after reading "The New Democracy" for the first time. "Why, this is merely British socialism; there's nothing to be afraid of here." Most people took the New Democracy at its face value and welcomed the opportunity of working with the Communist Party to clean up the mess left by the Kuomintang and to rebuild a strong, democratic state. But even one year of the new regime has revealed the true nature of the New Democracy. It is not new, it is certainly not democratic, and anything less like British socialism cannot be imagined.

In theory the New Democracy is a union of the four classes in the nation—workers, peasants, bourgeoisie and capitalists—under the leadership of the workers and the Communist Party. The sting is in the tail, for where the Communist Party leads no union or alliance is possible. The classes are tolerated so long as they follow the party line. There is in fact no union of the classes, but a domination of all classes by the party. In theory other political parties are allowed, and many do exist, but they are all pale imitations of the Communist Party, and they know that the moment they deviate from the party line they will be suppressed.

A great deal is said about the rights of the people and in this People's Republic everything belongs to them—the People's Bank, the People's bank-notes, the People's Police, the People's Army, etc. But who are the people? Not all the inhabitants of the country but only those who are not reactionary, and this comes to mean all those who do not follow the party line. The decisions are made not by the mass of the people but by those at the top. There is discussion at the broadest level. The people, in their village, provincial and national assemblies, are encouraged to make recommendations; these are forwarded to the next higher body until they reach the top, where the decision is made and then handed down as an order. This is supposedly based on the wishes of the people, but they have no direct voice, and the higher you go the farther away you are from the people.

No one has the remotest chance of being elected to any public body unless he is known to follow the party line. The candidates are hand-picked. The Communists are past masters in the art of stage management, and all assemblies are engineered and steered behind the scenes by the party representatives. They decide the agenda, they know beforehand what resolutions are to be adopted, they guide the discussion in the way they want. The Communists can boast with truth that in the assemblies, from National Assembly down to students' associations or local labor unions, they are in a small minority, but some who have taken part in such assemblies have admitted that nothing was said or done which the Communists had not planned for. A handful of Communists imposes its will on the majority and boasts that the process is entirely democratic. The New Democracy is democracy standing on its head.

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

ON THE USES OF HISTORY AND THE ABUSES OF HISTORIANS

by Emery Neff

THE AUTHOR of *The English: Are They Human?*, professor of Dutch History in the University of London, has turned his quizzical gaze upon his fellow historians. The vagaries of those he calls the rightists and the leftists in the historical profession offend his sense of proportion, which is closely allied with his sense of humor. On the farthest Right, he observes those who believe that the discovery of authentic facts is the whole duty of the historian. These students of the past for the past's sake

HISTORY: ITS PURPOSE AND METHOD, by G. J. Renier (The Beacon Press; $3).

he compares to the art-for-art's sake school of writers, who likewise disdain communication with the general public. Their insistence upon the aloof impersonality of the historian, in imitation of the scientific investigator striving to eliminate his personal equation, has aroused a leftist reaction among philosophers and men of letters who have tried their hands at writing history. The philosophers Croce and Collingwood have taken the counter-position that the historian can know the past only in so far as his temperament and experience of life permit him to re-enact it within his own mind. Anatole France pushed the subjective element in history to its extreme in declaring that a historian judges the significance of an event "arbitrarily, according to taste and whim, in his own way, in short as an artist."

These conflicting theories have for Professor Renier a common defect: They reduce history to something other than itself, to science, to art, to philosophy. He believes that history has a place of its own in human knowledge; it functions as a social agent, responsible for replying to "questions in which society asks for guidance" and for communicating answers in the form of a readable "story." Historians for history's sake go astray by neglecting this function; partisans of history as art, by skepticism concerning reliable answers. Philosophers like Croce and Collingwood accept the function but discharge it with dangerous unreliability by what Dr. Renier derisively calls "metaphysics and clairvoyance."

Society demands that the historian use his knowledge of the past to explain how the present and its problems came into being. This knowledge cannot be direct; it must derived by inference from "traces" which past events have left behind. Inference involves psychological problems of motivation and influence, the philosophical problem of causation. Does this mean that the historian must renounce the quest by the scientific method of secure knowledge that can be formulated into laws? To Renier, the phrasing of this question betrays an antiquated notion of scientific knowledge.

Nowadays scientists are fully aware that their results are provisional, always exposed to the necessity of revision. The true scientific method is the pragmatic method of William James and John Dewey; and this method "has been for generations the philosophy of historians, though they have been as unaware of it as M. Jourdain was that he talked prose." Philosophic doubt, even the physical necessity that the individual historian accept on trust much knowledge outside his special area, will not deter him from his practical task, which may include the writing of world history. Amused at the illogical indignation of professionals over such enterprises as Wells's *Outline of History*, Renier remarks: "A specialist historian who will not venture an opinion of the work of a specialist in another field betrays his inner uncertainties and casts doubt upon his knowledge of the historical method."

Although working in the spirit of science, history cannot be a science, strictly speaking; for it is unable to test its results by experiment. To predict the future by projecting historical trends, after the fashion of Spengler, Toynbee and the Marxists, is impossible, Renier reasons, because *all* the circumstances leading to a historical event are extremely unlikely to recur, and because "the fact that a set of circumstances has occurred once necessarily influences a set of circumstances which resembles it and occurs later." Continually changing its focus on the past in response to the needs of the present, history is for Renier the foe and solvent of all dogmatisms, whether Marxist, Fascist, or religious. But it should accordingly moderate its own claims: "The professionals of history who wish to raise their subject to the rank of a universal philosophy or to degrade it to the task of fact-collecting, have fostered the distrust of the outside world."

When he has found in the spirit of science answers to the questions society poses, the historian's task is not over; for he must communicate them in a "story" intelligible to a wide audience (not abstract sociology or philosophy of history). In the final third of the book Renier offers wise counsels in the art of writing which are the more impressive because of the clarity and grace of his own style, which has carried his wide learning with an ease that might have been deceptive without the abundant footnotes acknowledging its sources. A code of practical ethics for historians, based upon the principle that "the laws of good taste are universal," closes this outspoken, acutely reasoned, thoroughly civilized book, the more flavorful because of occasional crotchets in matters of detail.

Emery Neff is a professor of English at Columbia University and the author of "The Poetry of History," a study of the contribution of literature and literary scholarship to the writing of history.

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WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE

LET'S JOIN THE HUMAN RACE, by Stringfellow Barr (University of Chicago Press; 25 cents).

AT THE MOMENT when the United States appears on the point of making one complete and probably final effort to enforce peace by arming "our" world against "their" world, Stringfellow Barr publishes the pamphlet, *Let's Join the Human Race*, to suggest that we have misunderstood the problem and are misapplying our straitened resources. If he is right—and it would be difficult to argue reasonably that he is not—the situation is dolorous; there are few spectacles more depressing than that of a mortally sick patient being dosed with the wrong medicine.

According to Barr, the surpassing problem of our time is not the bomb, not aggressive nationalism, not freedom v. tyranny (though these are great and pressing); it is that the United States is a very rich suburb in a world gone almost wholly slum:

> Some two and two-tenths billions of human beings are alive today, and only a small fraction of them are either Russians or Americans. For most of them, there are far more urgent matters to think about than the cold war or communism or political freedom. They want to solve Problem Number One. We Americans have not been thinking clearly about Problem Number One—what we call "Point Four"—because, I believe, of the following false assumptions:
>
> *False Assumption Number One*: That Russia is all that stands between mankind and a stable peace.
>
> *False Assumption Number Two*: That American "know-how" and American money can rebuild the world economy, or enough of it to stop Russia.
>
> *False Assumption Number Three*: That "free enterprise" (what the non-American world still calls "private enterprise") can do the job better than government.
>
> *False Assumption Number Four*: That the job can be done on the basis of small yearly appropriations.

It is in the analysis of these fallacies that Barr makes his contribution to the productive discussion of international affairs; it can be fairly described as a brilliant exercise in fruitful logic. With malice toward none, with informed sympathy for the problems confronting men in positions of economic and political power, he nevertheless demonstrates that we are so far from meeting the issue that we have not yet seen what it is. Barr argues persuasively that, even if we had the will and the means to bestow social and economic decency on the slums that press about us, benevolence of this nineteenth-century type could not work. Justice is involved, not altruism; all the world is involved and all the world must speak and act together. Handouts on even an undreamed-of scale would only palliate the malady.

What Barr advocates is a "TVA of the World," but even as he speculates on how this might be organized, he insists that his present concern is not to urge a particular course of action, but to set his readers thinking for themselves on the basis of facts set down in the proper context and the proper size. We Americans, having everything to lose, ask ourselves, "How can we sleep?"; the rest of the world, having nothing to lose, demands, "When do we eat?" Put that way, it is easy to see which question is the more urgent and which the more likely to be answered first.

Barr is not at all certain that we still have time to act correctly; perhaps there must be still another war before we begin to think in world terms, which are now the minimum terms. There won't be much to work with after the next war, but "wisdom, armed with simple tools, might succeed where rich folly had failed."

Let's Join the Human Race can be bought from the publisher at wholesale (10 copies, $2.25; 25 copies, $5; 100 copies, $15). It is a simple tool placed in our hands before our folly has quite destroyed us. ROBERT HATCH

MUSIC: Metropolitan on a Bat

THE Metropolitan Opera went on a holiday spree by presenting a revival of Johann Strauss's "Die Fledermaus" so giddy and so handsome that it found itself with a popular hit on its hands. In the past, the sober old institution has seldom considered Viennese operetta its proper province. "Die Fledermaus" (or just plain "Fledermaus," as the management prefers to say) has not been given there since 1905; its last foray into the field was a production of von Suppé's "Boccaccio" given for Maria Jeritza in 1931. But Rudolf Bing, the Metropolitan's new general director, felt that he had demonstrated his artistic probity sufficiently with the honorable attention to such items as Verdi's "Don Carlo" and Wagner's "The Flying Dutchman." He suspected—rightly, as it turned out—that the public would warm to the notion, borrowed from the practice of Middle European opera houses, of using "Die Fledermaus" as a *jeu d'esprit* for some of the company's leading singers, and as a diversion from a solid diet of Mozart, Wagner and Verdi. He also hoped that a gala "Fledermaus" revival would initiate a noisy rustle of bills at the hungry box-office window.

For an audience that still remembered the charm and nostalgia of the Max Reinhardt adaptation called "Rosalinda," staged with exquisite taste and sensibility by Felix Brentano in 1942, no ordinary "Fledermaus" would have sufficed. It had to be a special occasion indeed if Mr. Bing's intention of creating a rapprochement between the Metropolitan and Broadway theatre-goers was to succeed; and moreover the patrons of the first performance had paid $20 apiece for orchestra seats when they bought their tickets as part of a costly package of "three firsts" (which also included the opening-night "Don Carlo" and the forthcoming "Fidelio" revival with Kirsten Flagstad and Bruno Walter).

As he had done when he asked Margaret Webster to direct "Don Carlo," Mr. Bing relied heavily on Broadway talent. Garson Kanin served as stage director, and rewrote the creaking book in breezy, up-to-date English,

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employing materials from both the original "Fledermaus" libretto of Haffner and Genée and the French farce by Meilhac and Halévy, "Le Reveillon," on which the operetta was based. Howard Dietz, whose record of distinguished service to Broadway musicals goes back to such memorable tidbits as "Three's a Crowd" and "The Band Wagon" in the early 1930s, provided new and toothsome lyrics. Jack Gilford, an endearing comic whom New Yorkers first met in the little revue called "Meet the People," undertook the non-singing role of the drunken jailer Frosch and won the day hilariously with such ancient business as sliding down a flight of stairs pratwise and endeavoring to hang a hat on a non-existent peg.

By forgetting about Old Vienna and concentrating on Broadway 1950, Bing created a "Fledermaus" so different from the *echt* and intimate "Rosalinda" that nearly everyone forgot to make comparisons. Rolf Gerard provided costumes that were sumptuous and beautiful modern comments on the styles of 1874, and settings that were splashily effective and wholly unlike the routine contents of the Metropolitan's scenic warehouse. Eugene Ormandy, making his debut as an opera-house conductor "with the kind permission of the Philadelphia Orchestra Association," obtained ideal pacing, well-nigh perfect precision and balance between the voices and the orchestra—though his conception of the music was hardly more Viennese than Kanin's of the book or Dietz's of the lyrics.

When Ljuba Welitch, in a trailing lavender negligee that swore at her bright red hair, gravely sang to Richard Tucker, "You've made your bed and you must lie in it," and when Patrice Munsel, as a chambermaid playing an aristocrat in a flamboyant bustled red gown, invited Set Svanholm to "Look me over once, look me over twice," the audience was enraptured. Miss Munsel, until now a promising apprentice, suddenly emerged a full-fledged star, and stopped the show dead twice in a soubrette role that was nearer to her completely American instincts than the Italian-language Lucias and Gildas she had grappled with heretofore. Risë Stevens (though her singing was mealy-mouthed and her enunciation bad) also scored an immense success in the transvestite role of Prince Orlofsky, a bored character so overloaded with money that he considers it a lark to burn it up in large bonfires. With a monocle, an eighteen-inch cigarette-holder and a Russian accent too thick to cut with an ordinary table-knife, she set forth one of Dietz's happiest lyrics, hinging on the tag line "Chacun à son goût," and wound up her song leaning against the proscenium arch (who ever dared lounge against the Metropolitan's proscenium before?) and flirting with the occupants of the stage box.

Compared to Miss Munsel and Miss Stevens, both of whom were flexible and assured enough to profit fully from Kanin's sharply-etched direction, the others in the cast were fish out of water. More precisely, Miss Welitch was a bull in a china shop. Without bothering in the slightest to build a characterization of Rosalinda, or, it often seemed, to apprehend the meaning of the words she spoke and sang, she threw herself into a romp, and whatever she lacked in pointedness of approach she made up for in foot-pounds of energy. The pity of it all was that she sang badly—persistently sharp, with a pale, characterless tone, and without the vigorous accents that are required to make a success of her biggest number, the celebrated czardas in the second act. Richard Tucker, as the tenor whose high A sends Rosalinda into an erotic ecstasy, sang more beautifully than anyone does in operetta outside the Metropolitan, and reacted somewhat to the humor of his task. Set Svanholm played a losing game, for he was stiff in demeanor and his voice could not shake off a Wagnerian heaviness. John Brownlee carried off a master-of-ceremonies role with dry Australian humor. Nana Gollner appeared as prima ballerina in Antony Tudor's choreography for the Johann Strauss waltz, "Roses from the South," surely the feeblest and most fatuous ballet ever devised by a man of reputation.

The first three performances of "Fledermaus" sold out immediately, and Bing hopes to give twenty or more before the end of the season. Since the Metropolitan has just issued an appeal for public contributions amounting to $750,000, it is good to know that one item in the repertory is sure to turn a profit. It is also good to have "Die Fledermaus" back again, for—Mozart and Verdi notwithstanding—it is one of the loveliest musical scores on the face of the earth.

CECIL SMITH

MOVIES: "Bloody, Bold and Resolute"

WORD OF the Orson Welles "Macbeth" has preceded it to New York and one takes a seat on the aisle, prepared for a quick escape if Glamis murders not only sleep but Shakespeare as well. The picture is by no means that bad; Welles's interpretation of the play is a perverse and limited one, but at least it *is* an interpretation, consistent and stated with conviction; perhaps for the screen it is even justifiable.

Taking his mood from the barbaric Holinshed chronicle rather than from the royal Elizabethan tragedy, Welles presents a "Macbeth" that looks at first glance as though it had been made in the Carlsbad Caverns by a company of Mongolian yak herders. Water seeps from every cave-like wall and every performer is shaggy and shining with bear grease. The producer-editor has made a patchwork of Shakespeare's lines and they are delivered with an uncouth savagery that deprives them of all their poetry and much of their sense. It is a performance in which the moral struggle—the tragedy—of "Macbeth" has been lost and violence is all.

The violence, however, is well stated; it is more than empty melodrama, having in it dark horror and a solemn recognition of the consequences of this brutish struggle. It is as though we watched our terrible ancestors in the

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dawn of history tearing at one another to establish the blood lines we now proudly call our heritage.

In this atmosphere, the witches appear to advantage; so do the murderers (of whom Macbeth is now one) and so does the spectacle of Birnam Wood moving upon Dunsinane. The soliloquies fare badly, the human relationships are reduced to surface struggles and the moments of tenderness, remorse and honor disappear entirely. Welles as Macbeth and Dan O'Herlihy and Edgar Barrier as Macduff and Banquo are striking primitive warriors; Alan Napier, in the invented role of an early church father, seems to have just given up painting himself blue and cutting the throats of human sacrifices in oak groves. On an animal level, these principal figures are impressive and even admirable. Jeanette Nolan is a ruthless, lustful but curiously undangerous-looking Lady Macbeth. There is not enough intelligence in her villainy.

All in all, it seems fair to say of Welles's "Macbeth" that he has lost more of the play than he has preserved, but that what he does keep he presents with power and a conviction that will make it stick in the mind.

Garson Kanin wrote "Born Yesterday" but the play belonged to Judy Holliday, and now so does the movie. "Born Yesterday" has changed slightly in its move from Broadway to Hollywood: some Yankee Doodle patriotism has been added; Broderick Crawford, as the junk tycoon, is more threatening, more unbalanced (a holdover perhaps from "All the King's Men"), than Paul Douglas was in the role. But details matter little in the face of the Holliday portrait of Billie Dawn, the dumb broad who finally reads a book. What the actress offers is satirical slapstick, an exceedingly tricky combination of wit and farce; when it succeeds it is the funniest thing the theatre has to offer, and Miss Holliday succeeds as few have done before her.

A much gentler humor, in fact a whimsey that is just around Pooh Corner from mawkishness, is offered in the screen adaptation of "Harvey," another Broadway hit. James Stewart plays the part of the inebriate rabbit fancier that was created by Frank Fay and subsequently taken over for sections of its phenomenal run by almost every comedian in America, including Stewart himself.

In the movie, Stewart is OK, and that is about the size of it. With every picture he is falling deeper into the rut of slack-witted amiability that Hollywood seems to think is his only talent. He walks through "Harvey" with no trouble and, I think, without taking any. At least he never succeeds in evoking the presence of his invisible pal, and if the audience does not momentarily believe in the six-foot rabbit, much of the fun goes up the flue.

Josephine Hull, as the eccentric Elwood P. Dowd's more than slightly hare-brained aunt, is stalwartly funny and the two leading players are capably backed up by Victoria Horne and Jesse White. If Harvey had been persuaded to put in a convincing non-appearance the picture might have been a fine entertainment.

It is a reliable rule of thumb that a picture boasting the "added attraction" of guest stars is so spectacular a turkey that its regular cast had no hope of saving it. A producer satisfied with his current epic is unlikely to broadcast an appeal for expensive talent donors; certainly Paramount would never have OK'd honorariums for Groucho Marx, Dorothy Kirsten, Peggy Lee and The Merry Macs if the prognosis for Bing Crosby's "Mr. Music" had not been exceedingly grave. The front office should have saved its money; Crosby, Charles Coburn, Ruth Hussey, Nancy Olson and Tom Ewell work frantically over the body, but it is dead long before the emergency squad arrives.

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

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